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SHALL BUSINESSES PROFIT IF THEIR OWNERS
LOSE THEIR SOULS? EXAMINING WHETHER
CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS MAY
SEEK EXEMPTIONS FROM THE
CONTRACEPTIVE MANDATE
Christopher S. Ross*
May for-profit, secular corporations claim the protection of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)?
This question is central to numerous lawsuits against the federal
government in which business owners argue that certain regulations under
the Patient Protection & Affordable Care Act substantially burden the
exercise of their religion. This Note examines the threshold hurdle that forprofit business owners must clear to successfully state a claim under RFRA:
the question of whether the businesses are “persons” the statute protects.
This is an issue of first impression for the U.S. Supreme Court, and it has
split the circuit courts of appeal.
First, this Note provides an overview of free exercise jurisprudence, with
a focus on the ebbs and flows of the Supreme Court’s exemption doctrine.
This overview includes a discussion of the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act and the laws, regulations, and religious objections that form the basis
of the current disputes. Second, this Note introduces the conflict among
circuit courts and their varying interpretations of whether for-profit
corporations are “persons” under RFRA. Third, this Note assesses this
conflict by examining RFRA’s text and the context in which Congress
enacted the statute. Nothing within this context precludes corporations
from stating RFRA claims. In addition, this Note examines legislative
history that supports application of the Dictionary Act, which explains that
the word “person” in federal statutes includes corporations. This Note
ultimately concludes that RFRA does indeed grant corporations the ability
to seek exemptions, but that the statute will require courts to undertake the
task of ascertaining the proper contours of the law as applied to different
corporate forms.

* J.D. Candidate, 2015, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2010, The King’s
College. I am grateful to my family and my friends for their constant love and support. I
would like to thank my adviser, Professor Abner Greene, for his guidance as I wrote this
Note.
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“In reality, the [Religious Freedom Restoration Act] will not guarantee
that religious claimants bringing free exercise challenges will win, but
only that they have a chance to fight.”1

INTRODUCTION
Religious observers typically act according to their religion’s view of the
ultimate good.2 This pursuit of the good can affect how an individual
orders his or her entire life.3 Sometimes, however, obedience to religious

1. H.R. REP. NO. 103-88, at 17 (1993) (Additional Views of Hon. Henry J. Hyde, Hon.
F. James Sensenbrenner, Hon. Bill McCollum, Hon. Howard Coble, Hon. Charles T.
Canady, Hon. Bob Inglis, Hon. Robert W. Goodlatte).
2. See Alan Brownstein, Taking Free Exercise Rights Seriously, 57 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 55, 86 (2006).
3. See id.
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dictates might require action that appears questionable to others or is even
against the law. Some Native American traditions, for example, suggest
that followers ingest certain hallucinogens as part of sacramental
ceremonies, even though the government classifies these hallucinogens as
controlled substances.4 In addition, many faiths require action outside of
ritualistic exercise. Thus, members of pacifist religions might refuse to
produce weapons in their work.5 Some religious acts, such as a Roman
Catholic nurse objecting to performing abortions,6 even offend the
sensibilities of those with different opinions on social or religious matters.7
For each of these religious actors, faith governs more than merely
association with the divine; it governs relationships, interactions with
society, personal development, and even careers.
A law or regulation might hinder or restrict religious exercise.8
Following a shift in the U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence that Congress
believed might result in increased burdens on religion, Congress enacted the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act9 (RFRA). RFRA sought to minimize
the burdens that the nation could place on religious believers and gave
courts the ability to review burdensome laws and exempt claimants
burdened by those laws.10 But Congress was silent on exactly who it
envisioned could take refuge within RFRA. Federal courts now face a
novel interpretive question: whether for-profit, closely held11 corporations
may claim the protection of this law. Indeed, in March of 2014, the U.S.
Supreme Court will hear a consolidated appeal of cases from the Third and
Tenth Circuits, which disagreed on the approach to this question.12
Plaintiffs in these cases object to a regulation promulgated by the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) under the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act13 (ACA). Over 300 plaintiffs claim

4.
5.
6.
7.

See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).
See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 710 (1981).
See Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 626 F.3d 695, 696 (2d Cir. 2010).
See The Opposition Is Overwhelming but Will the Administration Listen?, PLANNED
PARENTHOOD (Sept. 27, 2008), http://www.plannedparenthood.org/about-us/newsroom/
press-releases/opposition-overwhelming-but-will-administration-listen-22389.htm.
8. See, e.g., Smith, 494 U.S. at 874 (examining whether a state law classifying peyote
possession as a felony burdened the free exercise of the claimants’ religion).
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006).
10. See infra Part I.C.
11. This Note’s analysis focuses on closely held corporations, see infra note 241, in
discussing corporate RFRA claims. It does not analyze whether other business organizations
can also state RFRA claims. For a discussion of the relevance of corporate form to issues of
standing, see generally Steven J. Willis, Corporations, Taxes, and Religion: The Hobby
Lobby and Conestoga Contraceptive Cases, 65 S.C. L. REV. 1 (2013).
12. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013); Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of the U.S.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678
(2013).
13. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 26 and
42 U.S.C.).

2014]

CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND CONTRACEPTIVES

1955

that the HHS regulation burdens their religious exercise.14 The regulation,
known colloquially as “the HHS mandate,”15 requires employer-sponsored
insurance plans to provide some women’s preventive services, including
contraceptives and sterilization procedures, without requiring the employee
to share the cost.16 But it exempts companies below a certain size, as well
as religious and nonprofit organizations that meet a stringent test.17 Both
for-profit and nonprofit organizations have made religious objections to the
HHS mandate18—most coming from various Christian traditions that have
long opposed the use and distribution of contraception, particularly methods
that they believe have an abortive tendency.19
This Note examines a threshold hurdle that stands in the way of for-profit
corporations’ ability to state RFRA claims: the question of whether
corporations are “persons” under the statute. This is an issue of first
impression for the Supreme Court, and it has split the circuits.20 Part I of
this Note provides an overview of free exercise jurisprudence, with a focus
on the ebbs and flows of the Supreme Court’s exemption doctrine and
Congress’s legislative response. Part I also explains the laws and
regulations—and the religious objections—that form the basis of the current
disputes. Part II introduces this conflict more thoroughly by analyzing four
appellate decisions with differing opinions. Part III assesses this conflict,
concludes that the purposes anticipated by RFRA do not exclude
corporations, and provides the outline of a basic framework for courts as
they begin the daunting task of ascertaining RFRA’s contours for corporate
claimants.

14. See HHS Mandate Information Central, BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY,
http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
15. See id.
16. See Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of
Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg.
8725 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45 C.F.R. pt.
147); see also 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (Supp. V 2011).
17. See Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1122. For a description of the nonprofit exemption,
see infra notes 269–71.
18. See, e.g., Briscoe v. Sebelius, 927 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1112 (D. Colo. 2013)
(confronting the argument that a for-profit corporation run by an Evangelical Christian was
bound by faith not to provide access to abortion); Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, No.
3:12-CV-253(RLM), 2012 WL 6756332, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 31, 2012) (confronting the
argument that a nonprofit, Catholic educational institution was bound by religious doctrine
not to provide access to abortion, sterilization, or contraception).
19. See, e.g., POPE PAUL VI, HUMANAE VITAE ¶ 14 (1968), available at
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/encyclicals/documents/hf_pvi_enc_25071968_humanae-vitae_en.html (“[T]he direct interruption of the generative
process already begun and, above all, all direct abortion, even for therapeutic reasons, are to
be absolutely excluded as lawful means of regulating the number of children. Equally to be
condemned . . . is direct sterilization . . . .” (emphasis added)).
20. See infra Part II.
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I. FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE, LEGISLATIVE EXEMPTIONS, AND
CORPORATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: A BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court’s free exercise jurisprudence and Congress’s
subsequent reactions create a complex ebb and flow of tests and doctrines.
This Part first examines the history of free exercise and the Court’s cases
that established and then disestablished a regime of exempting religious
adherents from laws that burdened their religious exercise. It then examines
the legislative response to this line of cases and introduces how
corporations fit into the picture.
A. The Historical Understanding of the Free Exercise Clause
The question of exemptions for religious believers has roots in the
historical understanding of the Free Exercise Clause, which represents a
fusion of various political theories.21 A number of American colonies
protected religious dissenters and afforded members of religious sects the
opportunity to escape the religious persecution of both England and the
other colonies.22 The most protective colonies were the first to formulate
the free exercise of religion as a legal principle.23 Eventually, certain
colonial charters also allowed colonial proprietors to grant “indulgences and
dispensations” to religious believers burdened by the colony’s laws.24 This
exemption power was discretionary.25
Following the Revolutionary War, the new states and eventually the
federal government had to determine how best to protect religious liberty.26
For example, James Madison successfully27 proposed that Virginia’s Bill of
Rights protect “the full and free exercise of [religion].”28 The American
system would no longer be based on mere tolerance—religion was not a gift
from government, but rather a duty to God that no government could
abridge.29 By 1789, every state except Connecticut provided some
protection of religious freedom.30 This generally extended to religious

21. See John Witte, Jr., The Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in the American
Constitutional Experiment, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 371, 377–89 (1996).
22. See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1424–25 (1990).
23. See id. at 1425.
24. See id. at 1428 (quoting CAROLINA CHARTER OF 1665, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES 1328, 1338 (Benjamin Perley Poore ed., Washington, Gov’t Printing Office 2d ed.
1878)). For examples of legislatures and executives granting exemptions, see id. at 1467–
73.
25. See id. at 1428.
26. See id. at 1455, 1473.
27. See id. at 1443.
28. See Stephen Pepper, Taking the Free Exercise Clause Seriously, 1986 BYU L. REV.
299, 303 (alteration in original) (quoting Gaillard Hunt, James Madison and Religious
Liberty, in 1 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE YEAR
1901, at 163, 165–66 (1902)).
29. See McConnell, supra note 22, at 1443–44.
30. See id. at 1455.
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practice, in addition to belief.31 Accordingly, some states offered
accommodations32 to minorities whose beliefs were at odds with societal
mores.33 Free exercise rights, however, were subject to certain limitations
that served the interests of the states.34 For example, a state might allow
free exercise rights for peaceable actions, but not for licentious ones.35
When the several states joined to form the federal government, they
drafted a Constitution banning religious tests for office36 and allowing for
either oaths or affirmations.37 Beyond these, however, the Federalists
writing the Constitution saw little need to enact protection of religious
rights, as they believed that the nature of the federal system, checks and
balances between government branches, and the numerous religious sects
would ensure the protection of religious minorities.38 This argument did
not convince such groups as the Quakers, who feared the effects of laws
passed without consideration of minority beliefs.39 Later, to protect
individual liberty expressly, Congress enacted the Bill of Rights40 and,
within this set of amendments, the Religion Clause.41 Initially, the
delegates discussed religious liberty in terms of the “rights of conscience”

31. See id. at 1459 (explaining that the dictionaries of the day included “action” in their
definitions of “exercise”).
32. McConnell acknowledges that his examples of religious accommodation “were
initiated by the legislature.” Id. at 1473. He suggests, however, that it is reasonable to
suppose that framers of state and the federal free exercise provisions understood that courts
would create and enforce similar protections. Id.
33. See id. at 1467. For example, an oath requirement might ensure honest testimony in
court, but it would violate the religious beliefs of Quakers. Id. A Quaker in a lawsuit,
therefore, would not be able to testify in court. See id. To protect conscientious objectors,
most state governments allowed alternative procedures. Id.
34. See id. at 1461–62.
35. See id.
36. See U.S. CONST. art. VI.
37. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (providing the text of an oath or affirmation the president
must take before entering office); U.S. CONST. art. VI (requiring that all government officials
take an oath or affirmation to support the U.S. Constitution).
38. See McConnell, supra note 22, at 1475–80; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 84
(Alexander Hamilton).
39. See McConnell, supra note 22, at 1480. The Quakers’ concern comports with a
view of the Free Exercise Clause described by Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager,
who propose that the Free Exercise Clause should protect minority viewpoints rather than
privilege religion. See generally Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The
Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61
U. CHI. L. REV. 1245 (1994).
40. See U.S. CONST. amends. I–X.
41. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”). Scholars divide this section of the
First Amendment into two bodies of law. See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance
of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L.J. 1611, 1612 (1993); Ira C. Lupu, Threading Between
the Religion Clauses, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 439, 439 (2000). Each clause has its own
corresponding jurisprudence. Compare Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971)
(explaining a test for whether a law violates the Establishment Clause), with Emp’t Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990) (holding that neutral laws of general applicability do
not violate the Free Exercise Clause).
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but eventually decided on the “free exercise of religion.”42 As used in the
colonies and states, “free exercise” protected public conduct emanating
from religious motivation, including religious speech, worship, assembly,
publication, and education.43 Exercise also included the right to join with
other members of the faith to worship.44 This understanding of the Free
Exercise Clause fused views of both the importance of protecting religion
and the prevailing Enlightenment philosophy of the day by allowing
individuals to worship according to their conscience and restricting
government from interfering with religious practice.45
B. The Court Giveth and the Court Taketh Away: A History of Exemptions
in the Supreme Court
At its core, the Free Exercise Clause, made applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment,46 means the right to believe and to
profess religious doctrine.47 The Clause therefore prohibits the government
from any regulation of religious beliefs,48 such as compelling beliefs or
punishing religious expression.49
The extent to which the Clause protects conduct, however, has been the
subject of much debate.50 The Supreme Court initially protected matters of
belief, but not necessarily conduct.51 For example, the Mormon practice of
polygamy was religious, and Mormons sought to use religion as a defense
while on trial for violating an antipolygamy statute.52 The Court disagreed
and held that the Constitution did not require the government to allow

42. See McConnell, supra note 22, at 1482–83 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Free
exercise” protects more than the “rights of conscience,” according to McConnell. See id. at
1490. The former denotes the application of the religious belief, while the latter indicates
the knowledge or rationale of the belief. Id. at 1489. For the First Amendment, this is a key
distinction. Beliefs are definitively protected, but it would appear that actions undertaken as
a matter of sincere, religious belief receive protection too. See id. at 1491–96.
43. See Witte, supra note 21, at 394–95.
44. See id. at 395. The liberty to join in religious association included the liberty to
govern the religious body without governmental interference. See id.
45. See McConnell, supra note 22, at 1498–99 (“The religious view emphasizes the
importance of the individual; the Enlightenment, the incapacity of the government.”). For a
description of additional political and theological understandings that form the foundation of
the American conception and dedication to religious liberty, see generally Witte, supra note
21 (describing theories that yielded principles of liberty of conscience, free exercise of
religion, pluralism, equality, separationism, and disestablishment of religion).
46. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
47. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990).
48. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963).
49. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 877.
50. See infra Part I.B–D.
51. See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 345 (1890) (“Whilst legislation for the
establishment of a religion is forbidden, and its free exercise permitted, it does not follow
that everything which may be so called can be tolerated. Crime is not the less odious
because sanctioned by what any particular sect may designate as religion.”); Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (holding that laws banning polygamy were within
Congress’s legislative power).
52. See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 161.
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Mormons to state this belief as a defense before a jury.53 This distinction
between belief and conduct did not stand, however, in the latter half of the
twentieth century.54 Beginning in Sherbert v. Verner,55 the Court construed
the First Amendment to require exemptions from otherwise valid laws that
substantially burdened individuals’ religious beliefs or practice.56 Sherbert
and its progeny, including Wisconsin v. Yoder,57 presented cases where an
individual claimed that a law had the effect of hampering his or her
religious practice.
1. The Creation of the Exemption Regime: Sherbert v. Verner and
Wisconsin v. Yoder
The Supreme Court first articulated a standard for exemptions in
Sherbert.58 Adell Sherbert was a member of the Seventh-Day Adventist
Church when her employer adjusted the number of days in its work week.59
Because Sherbert refused to report to work on the Adventists’s holy day,
her employer discharged her.60 She sought unemployment benefits from
South Carolina’s Employment Security Commission, but the agency found
that her refusal to take Saturday work disqualified her.61 In response to
Sherbert’s free exercise challenge, the South Carolina Supreme Court
upheld the commission’s decision, holding that the unemployment statute
did not restrict her ability to observe her religious beliefs.62
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed South Carolina’s court, noting that the
Free Exercise Clause prevents the government from regulating “religious
beliefs as such.”63 It also acknowledged that it had rejected free exercise
challenges on the ground that legislation may restrict religious practices if
such practices threaten public safety, peace, or order.64 Despite this
precedent, the Court found that South Carolina’s withholding of
unemployment benefits was a substantial burden on the free exercise of
Sherbert’s religion.65 The state denied benefits because of her religiously
motivated action, and the pressure to forego her beliefs to obtain the benefit
was a substantial burden.66

53. See id. at 164, 166 (explaining that Congress’s legislation was “free to reach actions
which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order” and that a person may
not “excuse his practices . . . because of his religious belief”).
54. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
55. Id.
56. See Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L.
REV. 1465, 1473 (1999).
57. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
58. See 374 U.S. at 410.
59. Id. at 399.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 399–401.
62. See id. at 401.
63. Id. at 402.
64. Id. at 402–03.
65. Id. at 403.
66. Id.
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Because the law substantially burdened Sherbert’s religion, the Court
examined whether South Carolina had a compelling interest to justify
infringing upon her First Amendment rights.67 In light of the claim’s
constitutional basis, the Court explained that “[o]nly the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible
limitation.”68 The state argued that its interests were to prevent fraudulent
claims that might cause a dilution of the unemployment fund,69 but the
Court stated that this interest did not justify abridging Sherbert’s free
exercise rights.70 The state, therefore, had to exempt Sherbert from its law
and provide unemployment benefits.71
The Supreme Court later affirmed this analysis in Wisconsin v. Yoder.72
There, Amish parents declined to send their children to school after their
children completed the eighth grade.73 Wisconsin’s compulsory attendance
law required parents to send their children to school through age sixteen.74
The Amish parents were convicted of violating this law and fined $5.00
each.75
The Court noted that education is a strong state interest, but even such
strong interests are still subject to a balancing process.76 To determine the
balance in this case, the Court examined the Amish religion and found that
its commitment to not sending children to school beyond the eighth grade
was religiously motivated behavior.77 Indeed, despite increasing regulation
that had encroached upon the traditional Amish way of life, the religion’s
traditions had not changed.78 Amish families continued to believe that
additional schooling interfered with their way of life.79 The Court held that
the Wisconsin compulsory attendance law, which carried the threat of
criminal sanction, substantially burdened the petitioners’ religion.80 To

67. See id. at 406.
68. Id. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
69. See id. at 407.
70. See id.
71. Id. The Court did not directly state an intent to create a constitutionally compelled
exemption regime. In dissent, however, Justice John Marshall Harlan II explained that the
Court’s holding meant that “if the State chooses to condition unemployment compensation
on the applicant’s availability for work, it is constitutionally compelled to carve out an
exception—and to provide benefits—for those whose unavailability is due to their religious
convictions.” Id. at 420 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
72. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
73. Id. at 207. The Amish “believed that by sending their children to high school, they
would not only expose themselves to the danger of the censure of the church community, but
. . . also endanger their own salvation and that of their children.” Id. at 209.
74. Id. at 207.
75. Id. at 208.
76. Id. at 214–15 (“[O]nly those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise
served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.”).
77. See id. at 216–18.
78. Id. at 217.
79. Id. at 218.
80. See id.
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require compliance, the Court explained, would endanger or destroy Amish
religious exercise.81
Wisconsin argued that its interest in compulsory education was
sufficiently compelling to override the Amish religious practices.82 The
Court did not accept such a sweeping claim, however, and stated that the
government must present a specific interest and the harm that would result
if the government granted an exemption.83 The resulting analysis showed
that, as applied to the Amish petitioners, the additional years of school
required by the law would do little to serve the state’s interests, because the
Amish way of life centered around a separate agrarian community.84
Therefore, even though Wisconsin had a strong interest in education, the
Amish families satisfactorily demonstrated a need for an exemption from
the education law.85
Together, Sherbert and Yoder stood for the proposition that a religious
believer may obtain an exemption from a law by showing that the law
substantially burdens his or her free exercise of religion, and that the state
has no compelling interest that outweighs the burden in question.86 This
protection of religious faith extended to matters of action or conduct, and
not just belief.87 Moreover, if the state action could not withstand a court’s
scrutiny, the Constitution compelled the exemption.88

81. Id. at 219.
82. Id. at 221.
83. See id. In other words, the Court established that it would view free exercise
exemption claims with strict scrutiny. See Volokh, supra note 56, at 1467. In cases
concerning constitutional law, the Court views different types of claims with various levels
of scrutiny. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 551 (4th ed. 2011). When
important rights are at stake, the government must meet a heavy burden and show that the
law is “necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose.” See id. at 554 (emphasis
omitted). This is the strict scrutiny explained in Sherbert and Yoder, as well as the test
codified in RFRA. See infra Part I.C. The Court uses a more deferential level of review in
other contexts. The rational basis test requires that the government show that it is “rationally
related to a legitimate government purpose.” See CHEMERINSKY, supra, at 552 (emphasis
omitted).
84. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 222. Wisconsin also attacked the “ignorance” that Amish
parents would bequeath to their children. See id. The Court rebuked this critique of a
minority religion. Id. at 224 (“A way of life that is odd or even erratic but interferes with no
rights or interests of others is not to be condemned because it is different.”).
85. See id. at 235.
86. See id. at 240 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“Decisions in cases such as this . . . will
inevitably involve the kind of close and perhaps repeated scrutiny of religious practices, as is
exemplified in today’s opinion, which the Court has heretofore been anxious to avoid.”). But
see Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 39 (arguing that religion should not receive special
privilege, but rather that the law should regard religions equally). In a context in which
administrative schemes provide discretion to decisionmakers, therefore, courts should have
discretion to grant exemptions to protect religious minorities from veiled discrimination. See
Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 39, at 1299–1300.
87. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402–03 (1963); see
also Mark L. Rienzi, God and the Profits: Is There Religious Liberty for Moneymakers?, 21
GEO. MASON L. REV. 59, 65 n.40 (2013) (explaining that the key for protected activity is
motivation by religious belief).
88. See Volokh, supra note 56, at 1473 (explaining that before Sherbert, it was for
legislatures to grant exemptions, but that Sherbert “launched the constitutional exemption

1962

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

Following Sherbert and Yoder, courts heard a variety of cases in which
petitioners sought exemptions, claiming that laws burdened their religious
practice.89 For example, the Court granted an exemption to a Jehovah’s
Witness who was denied unemployment insurance after he quit his job in a
metal factory when he discovered that he was producing armaments.90 The
Court explained that it would not “dissect” his beliefs in order to determine
whether his understanding of his religion was “unreasonable.”91 Instead,
the Court found that Indiana’s law would require Thomas to modify his
beliefs in order to continue working, and that conditioning unemployment
benefits on this choice substantially burdened his religious exercise.92
Similarly, a woman who changed religions during the course of her
employment stated a valid free exercise claim when the unemployment
commission denied her benefits for failing to work on her Sabbath day.93
Claimants did not, however, always find success before the Supreme
Court.94 For example, claimants who were part of the armed forces could
not seek the same level of protection as civilians, even if a law substantially
burdened their religion, because of the military’s compelling interest in
“instinctive obedience” and the “esprit de corps.”95 A Jewish claimant,
therefore, could not challenge a regulation prohibiting his religious use of a
yarmulke.96 The Court also denied free exercise claims when the
exemption would require the government to adjust its internal affairs to
account for interference with—and not necessarily a burden on—an
individual’s spiritual development.97 For example, the government’s use of
social security numbers for administrative efficiency did not amount to
impairing religious beliefs or exercise.98 Finally, the meaning of “burden”
was in flux, and different interpretations of the term yielded different results
regime” under which the Constitution would compel an exemption if a law failed to pass
strict scrutiny).
89. See, e.g., Mozert v. Hawkins Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1065 (6th Cir.
1987) (explaining that requiring students to read certain materials without requiring them to
affirm or deny a belief or to participate in an objectionable practice is not an unconstitutional
violation of students’ free exercise); Bethel Baptist Church v. United States, 629 F. Supp.
1073, 1085–87 (M.D. Pa. 1986) (holding that requiring churches to pay social security taxes
was an indirect burden justified by a compelling governmental interest in a sound tax
program).
90. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 710–12, 720 (1981).
91. See id. at 715.
92. See id. at 717–18.
93. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 138, 141–42 (1987).
94. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (holding that a member of the
Old Order Amish religion could not receive an exemption from requirements to pay Social
Security taxes).
95. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986).
96. See id. at 510 (Stevens, J., concurring).
97. See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 449 (1988)
(holding that while construction on government land that was sacred to Native Americans
might hinder spiritual development, it did not burden religious beliefs or exercise); see also
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699–700 (1986) (explaining that the First Amendment did not
“require the Government itself to behave in ways” to further individuals’ spiritual
development).
98. See Bowen, 476 U.S. at 700.
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for claimants.99 These inconsistences in the application of the doctrine
caused some scholars to state that it rarely operated as strict scrutiny.100
2. The Fall of the Exemption Regime: Employment Division v. Smith
The Sherbert and Yoder exemption regime appeared to end in 1990,
when the Court shifted its Free Exercise Clause analysis to hold that neutral
laws of general applicability did not violate claimants’ free exercise
rights.101 In Employment Division v. Smith, two members of the Native
American Church lost their jobs at a drug rehabilitation facility after
ingesting peyote,102 a felony offense in Oregon, as part of a religious
ceremony.103 Relying on the Sherbert line of cases, the respondents sought
an exemption from Oregon’s law classifying possession of a controlled
substance as a felony.104 The Court distinguished their case from Sherbert,
however, where the religious behavior was not criminal.105 The Court
explained that granting respondents’ exemption claim would result in a
large expansion of free exercise rights because the law did not target their
religious practice and was otherwise constitutional against other peyote
users.106
The Court stated that it had never allowed an individual’s beliefs to
excuse that person from complying with valid laws within the state’s
purview.107 When it previously held that the First Amendment required
exemption from a neutral law of general applicability, such as in Yoder, it
was “in conjunction with other constitutional protections,” such as the right
to free speech or parental rights.108 The Court limited Sherbert to
99. See Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise
of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 961 (1989).
100. See Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise Is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise: Smith,
Lukumi, and the General Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850, 852 (2001);
Laura Underkuffler-Freund, The Separation of the Religious and the Secular: A
Foundational Challenge to First Amendment Theory, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 837, 852–53
(1995).
101. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990).
102. Peyote is a hallucinogen that comes from the plant Lophophora williamsii Lemaire.
See id. at 874.
103. See id. The Court accepted that the Smith petitioners were members of the Native
American Church. See id. A New York Times article, however, indicates that Alfred Smith
and Galen Black were guests at the ceremony in which they ingested peyote and that they
did so to learn about the religious practice, not to participate in a sacrament. See Oregon
Peyote Law Leaves 1983 Defendant Unvindicated, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1991, at A14.
104. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 876.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 878.
107. See id. at 878–79; see also id. at 880 (explaining that recent cases upheld neutral
laws of general applicability against free exercise challenges in Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599 (1961), and United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982)).
108. Id. at 881. Some, however, critique this “hybrid rights” view of the Court’s free
exercise jurisprudence, stating that it represents a misreading of such cases as Yoder. See
James G. Dwyer, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly of Employment Division v. Smith for
Family Law, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1781, 1784–85 (2011) (explaining that Yoder rejected
substantive due process claims as the basis of its holding and relied wholly upon free
exercise).
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unemployment cases, and explained that where state unemployment
benefits programs allowed for individual exemptions, the state must
describe a compelling reason for extending the system to cases of religious
hardship.109 Outside of this limited scope, the Free Exercise Clause did not
require court-created exemptions from otherwise neutral, generally
applicable laws.110 The Court thus rejected the idea that the Constitution
compelled application of the Sherbert balancing test to general laws that
incidentally burdened individuals’ free exercise of religion.111 Free
exercise claims that challenged neutral laws of general applicability would
receive only rational basis review going forward.112
Justice Antonin Scalia bolstered his Smith holding in two additional
ways.
First, he explained the problems associated with judicial
determination of questions about religion, even in case-by-case
proceedings.113 Second, he explained that subjecting generally applicable
laws to the compelling interest test whenever such a law burdened a
person’s religious exercise “would be courting anarchy.”114 He did,
however, note that even if the First Amendment did not require judicially
crafted exemptions for these reasons, the legislature might be more
accommodating.115 Indeed, he pointed to state accommodations of
sacramental peyote use as a “solicitous” protection of the value of religious
freedom.116
Between 1963 and 1990, the Court created a process of exempting
religious behavior from burdensome laws and then later claimed not to have
such power. Legal scholars fiercely debated whether the First Amendment
required such exemptions.117 Following Smith, however, free exercise

109. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882–85.
110. See id.; see also Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 39, at 1247.
111. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884–85.
112. See, e.g., Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 671 (7th Cir. 2013); Fortress Bible
Church v. Feiner, 694 F.3d 208, 220 (2d Cir. 2012).
113. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 887 (“Repeatedly and in many different contexts, we have
warned that courts must not presume to determine the place of a particular belief in a religion
or the plausibility of a religious claim.”).
114. See id. at 888.
115. See id. at 890.
116. Id. (“It is therefore not surprising that a number of States have made an exception to
their drug laws for sacramental peyote use.”).
117. Compare Gerard V. Bradley, Beguiled: Free Exercise Exemptions and the Siren
Song of Liberalism, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 245, 248 (1991) (arguing that constitutionally
compelled exemptions are “manifestly contrary to the plain meaning of the Free Exercise
Clause”), and Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An
Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915, 940 (1992) (asserting that individuals
historically sought occasional exemptions from certain laws but that this did not amount to a
general or a constitutional right to an exemption), with McConnell, supra note 22, at 1513–
16 (arguing that the First Amendment requires religious exemptions).
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claims required courts to analyze whether a law was neutral118 and
generally applicable.119 The Constitution did not allow for exemptions.
C. Congress Restores the Exemption Regime:
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
Justice Scalia’s opinion in Employment Division v. Smith inspired intense
debate.120 In response, a strongly bipartisan Congress121 passed RFRA,
which reinstated the Sherbert regime and instructed the courts to analyze
laws burdening religious practice with strict scrutiny.122 Professor Douglas
Laycock, a major academic force behind the law, explained that the drafters
intended RFRA to ensure that people need not abandon their religious
beliefs to comply with the law.123 In its findings, Congress explained that
neutral laws “may burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to
interfere with religious exercise,”124 that “governments should not
substantially burden religious exercise without compelling justification,”125
and that the Smith Court “virtually eliminated the requirement that the
government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral
toward religion.”126 The Act’s purpose, then, was to restore Sherbert and
Yoder’s compelling interest test.127
To achieve its goals, RFRA provided in its operative section as follows:
(a) In General—Government shall not substantially burden a person’s
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section.

118. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993) (holding that a law directly targeting religious practices was unconstitutional).
119. See Duncan, supra note 100, at 851 (“[T]he key to understanding the Constitution’s
protection of religious liberty in the post-Smith world is to locate the boundary line between
neutral laws of general applicability and those that fall short of this standard.”).
120. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism,
58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308, 308 (1991) (defending Smith against McConnell and others);
Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1109, 1110 (1990) (critiquing the analysis in Smith).
121. See Remarks on Signing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 29
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2377–78 (Nov. 16, 1993) (explaining that the bill passed in the
Senate ninety-seven to three and had overwhelming support in the House of Representatives
on a voice vote).
122. See The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat.
1488, invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), amended by Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006)).
123. See Douglas Laycock, RFRA, Congress, and the Ratchet, 56 MONT. L. REV. 145, 146
(1995) (explaining, among other examples, that RFRA might protect those who run a day
care, because the government might not see day care management as religious exercise).
124. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(2).
125. See id. § 2000bb(a)(3).
126. See id. § 2000bb(a)(4); see also Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 671 (7th Cir. 2013)
(“RFRA represents a congressional judgment that the rule of Smith is insufficiently
protective of religious liberty.”).
127. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b).
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(b) Exception—Government may substantially burden a person’s
exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden
to the person—
(1)

is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and

(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.128

To apply this test, courts must examine the application of the interest to the
individual claimant, rather than to the general population.129 In addition,
the nature of compelling interest as articulated in Yoder, Sherbert, and other
pre-Smith cases places a high burden on the government to articulate
concrete reasons for the law’s application.130 This strict scrutiny applies
only if a law is a substantial burden of religious exercise.131 Thus, neither
an insubstantial burden nor a burden on nonreligious activities qualifies for
the protection afforded by RFRA.132
In the committee report that accompanied RFRA, Congress explained
that it expected courts to rely on free exercise cases decided before Smith to
determine whether religious exercise has been burdened.133 Moreover, the
committee explained that it did not intend to codify any specific free
exercise decision, but rather to restore the Court’s legal standard in those
cases.134 A court must still consider relevant facts and circumstances.135
Federal courts have interpreted RFRA to expressly require accommodation
instead of insisting on Smith neutrality.136
Congress defined certain operative terms in RFRA.137 Its broad scope
was clear through its definition of “government,” which included the
various parts of federal, state, and local governing bodies.138 In addition,
Congress defined the “exercise of religion” as “the exercise of religion
under the First Amendment to the Constitution.”139 Scholars noted that
defining “religion” any other way would prove difficult to adjudicate, and
that courts had already shown the ability to differentiate between religiously
128. See id. § 2000bb-1. Any person may state a claim for judicial relief if a law burdens
the exercise of their religion. See id. § 2000bb-1(c).
129. See Laycock, supra note 123, at 148.
130. See Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 73 TEX. L. REV. 209, 222–26 (1994).
131. See id. at 228.
132. See id.
133. H.R. REP. NO. 103-88, at 7 (1993).
134. See id.; see also Laycock & Thomas, supra note 130, at 218.
135. See Laycock & Thomas, supra note 130, at 218.
136. See Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 671–72 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting O’Bryan v.
Bureau of Prisons, 349 F.3d 399, 401 (7th Cir. 2003)).
137. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2 (2006). Notably, Congress did not define “person.” See
infra Part II.
138. See The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141 § 5, 107
Stat. 1488, invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), amended by
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114
Stat. 803 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2).
139. See id. This language was amended by the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000. The current version can be found at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A).
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motivated and nonreligious behavior.140 Principal organizers of RFRA
indicated, however, that it would protect individuals and that the Dictionary
Act’s default definition of “person”141 meant it would also cover religious
organizations.142 Defining the statute in such broad terms was not only a
political necessity to keep Congress out of the weeds of specific
applications; it was also a matter of principle because the statute performed
a constitutional function by enacting the congressional understanding of the
Free Exercise Clause.143
The statute’s sweep was also clear from its broad applicability; as
originally enacted, RFRA “applie[d] to all Federal and State law, and the
implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether
adopted before or after [November 16, 1993],” unless Congress excluded
applicability through explicit reference to 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3.144
Because of its applicability to every law passed by any local, state, or
federal government, RFRA garnered a reputation as a “super-statute.”145
Because the law had such breadth and swept across the entirety of
American law, it was not simply a change from Smith.146 Rather, it
represented a substantially different vision of religious liberty and indicated
Congress’s intent to allow people of all religious persuasions to enjoy a
fundamental right by restoring pre-Smith free exercise protection.147
140. See Laycock & Thomas, supra note 130, at 233–34.
141. See 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). For further explanation of the Dictionary Act, see infra
note 215.
142. See Laycock & Thomas, supra note 130, at 234. Interestingly, early drafts of RFRA
defined “person,” whereas the enacted version did not. See H.R. 5377, 101st Cong. § 4(4)
(1990) (defining person as “natural persons and religious organizations, associations, or
corporations); H.R. 4040, 102d Cong. § 5(4) (1991) (defining person as “natural persons and
organizations, association [sic], corporations, or other entities”). The use of legislative
history in statutory interpretation is frequently suspect, especially when the history is
unexplained, prior versions of a statute. See JOSEPH L. GERKEN, WHAT GOOD IS LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY? JUSTICE SCALIA IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 22 (2007); Max Radin,
Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 873 (1930). The difficulty lies in weighing
the relative value of various sources. See CHRISTIAN E. MAMMEN, USING LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY IN AMERICAN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 66 (2002). If a judge can determine a
reason for the change, however, it might be useful in interpreting the statute. See JOHN F.
MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION & REGULATION 159–60 (1st ed. 2010).
143. See Laycock & Thomas, supra note 130, at 219.
144. See The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 § 6.
145. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It: Religious Freedom and the
U.S. Code, 56 MONT. L. REV. 249, 253–54 (1995) (“RFRA is thus a powerful current
running through the entire landscape of the U.S. Code.”).
146. See Laycock & Thomas, supra note 130, at 244–45.
147. See id. There is some debate about whether Congress intended to expand pre-Smith
protection through RFRA, or whether it intended to restore this protection. Compare Michael
C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1175, 1213 (1996)
(“RFRA does not, however, simply restore the pre-Smith law.”), with H.R. REP. 103-88, at
15 (Additional Views of Hon. Henry J. Hyde, Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Hon. Bill
McCollum, Hon. Howard Coble, Hon. Charles T. Canady, Hon. Bob Inglis, Hon. Robert W.
Goodlatte) (“[T]he bill does not reinstate the free exercise standard to the high water mark as
found in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder, but merely returns the law to the state it
existed prior to Smith.”). Because the Court frequently rejected pre-Smith free exercise
claims using the Sherbert test, see supra notes 94–100 and accompanying text, the difference
between expanding and restoring pre-Smith protection matters for resolving the merits of
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Professor Eugene Volokh explained that RFRA sought to restore the
courts as decisionmakers on claims of religious freedom, contrary to
Smith’s claim that courts were not the proper body to make such
decisions.148 Sherbert launched a constitutional model in which courts
decided who would receive exemptions, but Smith instructed that
exemptions should be purely statutory.149 RFRA, then, adopted a model in
which courts would evaluate claims individually and continue to build upon
Sherbert and its progeny.150 Volokh called this the “common-law
exemption model” because it granted courts the “initial discretionary
decision-making power” and asked them to design a jurisprudence in
accordance with Congress’s vision for religious liberty.151
In addition, RFRA claimed that the pre-Smith compelling interest test
provided a sensible balance between religious liberty and the government’s
interests.152 A judge striking this balance does not necessarily have the
final say, however, because the decision would be statutory and not
constitutional.153 In matters of statutory interpretation, judges must
interpret the law and might make incremental changes, but legislatures
retain ultimate authority to reverse judicial action.154 If Congress
determined that a court was “too stingy” in withholding an exemption from
a statute that substantially burdens a person’s religious exercise, then it
could enact a specific exemption to address that situation.155 Conversely, if
Congress found that a court overreached in granting an exemption, it could
amend the relevant statute to withhold exemptions.156 Although the
decisions in individual RFRA cases would be final, the underlying statute
could be amended for future application, placing claims for religious liberty
into the political process, which is how American law generally developed
in a common law system.157 Thus, the law acts to overcome legislative
inertia by granting individuals the ability to petition courts for redress rather
than wait for legislatures to act.158 RFRA may also encourage courts to

RFRA claims. This Note, however, does not address the substance of the HHS mandate
claims and therefore does not attempt to resolve this issue.
148. See Volokh, supra note 56, at 1468.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See id. at 1470.
152. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5) (2006).
153. See Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 BYU L. REV.
221, 253 (“If the Court strikes the balance in an unacceptable way, Congress can respond
with new legislation.”).
154. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 5–6 (1982).
155. See Volokh, supra note 56, at 1476.
156. See id.
157. See id. at 1469. Like Volokh, this Note does not refer to common law “in the
specific sense of the particular body of contract, tort, and property law” developed over
centuries by Anglo-American courts, but rather “in the general sense of ‘law made initially
by judges but subject to statutory override.’” Id. at 1469 n.10.
158. See id. at 1481.

2014]

CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND CONTRACEPTIVES

1969

grant exemptions more generously, sound in the knowledge that the
legislature possesses an additional level of review.159
D. An Overstep of Authority: The Court Limits RFRA’s Reach
Although Congress enacted RFRA with strong bipartisan support, the
Supreme Court held that Congress exceeded its power by extending the
law’s reach to local and state governments.160 In City of Boerne v.
Flores,161 a Catholic church in Texas sought review of a local zoning board
decision denying its application for a building permit.162 In response, the
city challenged the constitutionality of the law.163 The Court explained that
Congress relied on its enforcement power in section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment,164 which Congress can use to address constitutional violations
in the states.165 This enforcement power, however, has limits.166 Any
enforcement mechanism passed pursuant to section five must actually
enforce the Constitution, not substantively change its meaning.167 The
Court defined this requirement by saying there must be congruence and
proportionality between the injury the law seeks to prevent and the means it
adopts to effect that end.168 Without congruence and proportionality, a
legislative act effects a substantive change beyond enforcement.169 For
RFRA, specifically, the Court found a dearth of examples where
legislatures passed laws because of religious bigotry.170 Rather, the Court
found that RFRA addressed occasional, incidental effects that general laws
can have on religious exercise.171

159. See id. at 1487. Critics of RFRA suggested that Congress asked the Court to do
precisely what the Court rejected in Smith: to engage in a balancing of religious claims with
governmental interests. For examples of such critiques, see id. at 1491 n.70 (quoting various
scholars critiquing RFRA).
160. See generally City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); see also Christopher L.
Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Congressional Power and Religious Liberty After City of
Boerne v. Flores, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 79, 86–87.
161. 521 U.S. 507.
162. See id. at 511.
163. See id. at 517. The Court’s analysis in Boerne appeared to limit the constitutional
question to RFRA’s legitimacy as applied to state and local governments. The Court later
applied RFRA to the federal government in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente
Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
164. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”).
165. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 517–18.
166. See id. at 518.
167. See id. at 519 (“Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what
the right is.”).
168. See id. at 520; see also Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 160, at 87.
169. See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 160, at 88. The Court confirmed this analysis by
analyzing the history of the Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption, see Boerne, 521 U.S. at
520–26, as well as its early section five jurisprudence. Id. at 524–25 (explaining that in The
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), the Court held that section five allowed for legislation
that corrects state constitutional violations, but does not allow general legislation).
170. See id. at 530.
171. Id. at 530–31 (citing examples from the legislative history, including “anecdotal
evidence of autopsies performed . . . in violation of” certain religious beliefs).
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RFRA, it held, was not proportional to what it sought to remedy.172
Instead, its “[s]weeping coverage” included local, state, and federal laws
without temporal limitation.173 For these reasons, the congruence and
proportionality required by section five were not present.174 According to
the Court and some scholars, this decision was necessary on federalism
grounds because it protected the states from overweening action by the
federal government.175 On the other hand, Justice Anthony Kennedy’s
opinion elevated the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution above the
interpretation of the other branches and gave little to support his assertions
that the other branches cannot engage with the Court on the meaning of a
constitutional provision.176
The Court did note, however, that in its proper spheres of responsibility,
Congress “has not just the right but the duty to make its own informed
judgment on the meaning and force of the Constitution.”177 Thus, the
Court’s precedent compelled the application of Smith in Boerne, but the
Court’s reasoning left the possibility that if RFRA were enacted in
accordance with Congress’s powers, then it could apply to the federal
government.178 Boerne’s federalism rationale also inspired a wave of state
analogues to RFRA that reflected what the Court stripped from the federal
RFRA.179
The Court confirmed RFRA’s applicability to federal laws and
regulations in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do
Vegetal180. There, the Court entertained a claim by a Brazilian Christian
Spiritist sect, O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegtal (UDV),
seeking an exemption from the federal Controlled Substances Act181 (CSA).
Part of the sect’s worship was ingesting hoasca, a tea brewed from two
plants.182 One of the plants in the tea contained dimethyltryptamine, which
the CSA classified as a Schedule I drug.183 The tea was central to UDV’s
rituals, and banning it indisputably burdened the church’s religious
exercise.184
The Court explained that RFRA requires the government to justify a
compelling interest to burden a person seeking an exemption.185 The
172. See id. at 532.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 533 (“The stringent test RFRA demands of state laws reflects a lack of
proportionality or congruence between the means adopted and the legitimate end to be
achieved.”).
175. See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, City of Boerne v. Flores, A Landmark for Structural
Analysis, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 699, 711–12 (1998).
176. See ABNER S. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION 238 (2012).
177. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 535.
178. Id. at 536.
179. See Volokh, supra note 56, at 1468 n.6 (compiling state analogues to RFRA).
180. 546 U.S. 418, 428 (2006).
181. See id. at 425 (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971 (2006)).
182. See id.
183. See 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) sched. 1(c)(6).
184. See Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 426.
185. See id. at 430.
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government must state more than “broadly formulated interests,” and the
Court “must searchingly examine” the government’s interests, as well as
any impediments flowing from granting an exemption.186 This level of
strict scrutiny results in a highly fact-intensive analysis for each claim.187
In Gonzales, the Court held that the government’s argument for a
compelling interest in uniform application of the law failed.188 The CSA
contained a provision allowing for nonuniform enforcement, so the
government could not claim uniform enforcement as a compelling
interest.189 The Court thus found that the law could support exemptions
and held that the application of the CSA to the 140 members of the UDV
sect violated RFRA.190 RFRA granted the power of exemption to judges,
and the Court used this power to exempt the UDV.191
E. Free Exercise Claims by Profit-Seeking Individuals and Corporations
The Court has not yet used its RFRA exemption power to entertain a
claim from a secular corporation.192 The Court has heard, however, free
exercise claims from individuals involved in the pursuit of profit193 and
corporations organized around religious ends.194 In addition, it has
articulated a standard for applying First Amendment rights to corporations,
which have long been considered “persons” in many aspects of statutory
law.195 This section briefly explores each of these aspects.

186. Id. at 431 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972)).
187. See id. at 430.
188. See id. at 434–37.
189. See id. Similarly, a longstanding exemption on the use of peyote for religious
purposes supported the argument that uniform application of the Controlled Substances Act
was a weak argument. It showed that Congress expected certain limitations on the Act and
that the Act did not require uniform application. Id. at 434–35.
190. See id. at 438–39.
191. See id. The Gonzales case did not challenge the constitutionality of RFRA, so
whether the law violates the Establishment Clause or represents an overreach of Congress’s
powers applied to the federal government is still a possible source of future litigation.
192. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. 641, 642 (2012) (Sotomayor,
Circuit Justice) (denying application for an injunction pending appellate review).
193. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (adjudicating a claim by
merchants who believed a law burdened their religious exercise).
194. See, e.g., Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 425 (adjudicating free exercise claim by
incorporated church group); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520 (1993) (same); see also Scott W. Gaylord, For-Profit Corporations, Free Exercise,
and the HHS Mandate, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 40), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2237630.
195. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); see also Julie
Marie Baworowsky, Note, From Public Square to Market Square: Theoretical Foundations
of First and Fourteenth Amendment Protection of Corporate Religious Speech, 83 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1713, 1723–47 (2008) (explaining three theories of corporations and the
availability of corporate speech under each).
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1. Claims from Individuals in the Pursuit of Profit
In several cases, the Supreme Court has heard free exercise challenges to
laws that allegedly burdened the religion of individuals engaged in
business.196 The Court decided Braunfeld v. Brown before it created the
Sherbert regime, but it contained seeds of the compelling interest test.197
The plaintiffs were Orthodox Jews who claimed that a law requiring their
stores to close on Sundays violated their free exercise of religion; the
plaintiffs already closed for the Sabbath on Saturdays, and would therefore
lose further economic benefit.198 Although the Court accepted that this
would be a result, it held that the state had a compelling interest in Sunday
closing laws, and that the interest in a uniform day of rest outweighed the
business owners’ free exercise claims.199
In United States v. Lee,200 decided after Sherbert and Yoder, the Court
examined the claims of an Old Order Amish farmer and carpenter who did
not pay Social Security taxes for several employees on the grounds that the
Amish faith forbids receipt of and contributions to Social Security.201 The
Court held that the law burdened Lee’s religious exercise, but it also found
that the government’s interest in a uniform Social Security system justified
this burden.202 The Court distinguished the feasibility of exemptions from
Social Security from Yoder, where the exemption was from an education
system.203 In short, the Court found that exemptions from a tax system
would be difficult to manage if myriad faith groups sought exemptions.204
In these cases, an individual in his capacity as either an employee or an
employer sought judicial protection from a law that burdened the exercise
of his religion.205 Without that protection, the petitioners would face the
choice of following the instructions of their religion and losing a
government benefit, or abandoning their religion to gain a benefit.206

196. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 254 (1982); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450
U.S. 707, 710 (1981); Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 601.
197. See Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 603–04 (“[L]egislative power over mere opinion is
forbidden but it may reach people’s actions when they are found to be in violation of
important social duties or subversive of good order, even when the actions are demanded by
one’s religion.”).
198. See id. at 601.
199. See id. at 608–09 (explaining that allowing an exemption from the single day of rest
for business owners of other religions could create enforcement problems or unfair economic
advantage); see also Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 435 (explaining the meaning of Braunfeld for the
Court’s analysis of individual exemptions to state’s interests).
200. 455 U.S. 252.
201. See id. at 254–55.
202. See id. at 257–60.
203. Id. at 259–60.
204. See id.
205. See supra notes 196–204 and accompanying text; see also Korte v. Sebelius, 735
F.3d 654, 679–81 (7th Cir. 2013).
206. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 144 (1987).
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2. Claims from Religious Nonprofit Corporations
In addition to claims from individuals in the pursuit of profit, the
Supreme Court has entertained claims from corporations organized for
religious purposes, even though such nonprofit corporations do not pray,
worship, or undertake any act independent of the individuals comprising
them.207 Gonzales was the most recent RFRA claim by a nonprofit
organization.208 There, the petitioner was a New Mexico corporation.209
Thirteen years earlier, the Court heard a free exercise claim from a Florida
nonprofit corporation in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah.210 The church in that case was part of the Santeria religion211 and
sued the city over an ordinance forbidding the sacrifice of animals in the
town.212 The Court held that such laws intentionally targeting religious
exercise were not neutral, and therefore received strict scrutiny rather than
Smith’s rational basis review.213 Ultimately, the law did not survive that
level of scrutiny.214
In each of the cases described in Part I.E.1 and I.E.2, the Court did not
question whether the religious person or corporation had the ability to assert
a claim. Both individuals in the search of profit and corporations organized
around religious principles could equally seek exemptions under the Free
Exercise Clause, and a religious corporation could state a claim under
RFRA. The Court did not always grant such exemptions, but when it did,
the availability of an exemption hinged on the balancing test rather than on
who stated the claim.
3. Theories of the Corporation and Corporate First Amendment Claims
American law regularly considers corporations to be “persons” for
purposes of statutory construction.215 Corporations are separate legal
entities with rights, obligations, and liabilities that are different from those
of their owners and operators.216 The Court has explained that a
207. See Gaylord, supra note 194, at 55. Rather, nonprofits act according to their
directors’ instructions. See id. at 65.
208. See supra notes 180–91 and accompanying text.
209. Joint Appendix at 18, Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal,
546 U.S. 418, 435 (2006) (No. 04-1084), 2005 WL 1628869 (reproducing plaintiff’s
complaint).
210. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
211. See id. at 524.
212. See id. at 525–28 (explaining the town’s distaste for the religion’s practices of
ritualistic animal slaughter and the process by which it created laws curtailing the practice).
213. See id. at 542–46.
214. Id. at 546. But cf. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983)
(rejecting a religious freedom claim on the grounds of compelling interest, not standing).
215. See, e.g., 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (defining the word “person” in the U.S. Code as
inclusive of corporations, partnerships, trusts, and other entities unless the context of the law
dictates otherwise); 18 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 72 (2013); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A.
GARNER, READING LAW 273 (2012) (explaining the artificial person canon of construction,
which mirrors the Dictionary Act).
216. 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 1 (rev. vol. 2006).
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corporation is “an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in
contemplation of law.”217 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “corporation” as
an entity “having authority under law to act as a single person distinct from
the shareholders who own it and having rights to issue stock and exist
indefinitely.”218 A corporation, therefore, is a separate legal entity with
distinct rights and obligations and is the product of positive law.219
Corporations do business through a board of directors, not through
shareholders.220 Many corporations elect to make business decisions based
on values and principles outside of the bottom line, and many corporations
have adopted a theory of corporate social responsibility as a meaningful
purpose of doing business.221
A corporation might be a “person” for purposes of a statute if such a
construction will give effect to the purpose or the spirit of the law.222 The
U.S. Code recognizes this in the Dictionary Act223 by providing a rebuttable
presumption that the word “person” in a statute includes corporations, and
courts have held that a corporation does not literally need to be the actor for
such statutes, because corporations do nothing without human actors.224
Language imparting personhood to corporations has existed as long as
corporations have,225 although the prevailing theories of corporations have
changed.226 Three dominant theories of corporations include the artificial
person theory, the contractual theory, and the real entity theory.227
The artificial person theory was the earliest theory of corporations in
American law.228 It taught that a corporation was an artificial entity created
through legislative grant and controlled by the state for public reasons.229

217. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 517, 636 (1819).
218. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 391 (9th ed. 2009) (listing and defining numerous types
of corporations).
219. See Thomas E. Rutledge, A Corporation Has No Soul—The Business Entity Law
Response to Challenges to the PPACA Contraceptive Mandate, 5 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV.
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 20–23), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2294582. But see
Jonathan T. Tan, Comment, Nonprofit Organizations, For-Profit Corporations, and the HHS
Mandate: Why the Mandate Does Not Satisfy RFRA’s Requirements, 47 U. RICH. L. REV.
1301, 1355 (2013) (arguing that the separate legal status of a corporation is true for both
nonprofit and for-profit corporations).
220. See Rutledge, supra note 219, at 21; see also Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J.
Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83, 87 (2010).
221. See Rienzi, supra note 87, at 83–84 (providing the examples of Whole Foods and
Chipotle that have adopted social purposes as part of their business platforms).
222. See FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 216, § 7.05.
223. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
224. See Jeremy M. Christiansen, Note, “The Word[] ‘Person’ . . . Includes
Corporations”: Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Protects Both For- and
Nonprofit Corporations, 2013 UTAH L. REV 623, 645–46.
225. See Margaret M. Blair, Corporate Personhood and the Corporate Persona, 2013 U.
ILL. L. REV. 785, 796.
226. See id. at 798–808 (explaining three theories of corporations).
227. See id.
228. See Katherine Lepard, Note, Standing Their Ground: Corporations’ Fight for
Religious Rights in Light of the Enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
Contraceptive Coverage Mandate, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1041, 1044 (2013).
229. See Baworowsky, supra note 195, at 1725.
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Indeed, corporate charters frequently went to the politically connected
elite.230 Under this theory, the corporation, with purposes dictated by the
state, could not assert a claim against the entity that allowed its existence.231
The contractual theory arose in backlash to the artificial person theory,
which granted corporate status as a privilege.232 Corporations desired
protection from the regulatory power of the government, so states created
statutes through which individuals could join together and incorporate
businesses to pursue legal business activities.233 This theory asserted that
the sole goal of a corporation is profit234 and ostensibly viewed corporate
rights as those of the individuals joined together for sake of the business.235
The contractual theory crumbled, however, as publicly traded companies
increased the number of shareholders involved in a business venture.236
The real entity theory replaced the dying contractual theory and is a
middle ground between the contractual and the artificial entity theories.237
The theory accounts for the natural human inclination to associate and to
form purposeful groups, and it holds that individual owners are different
from the directors.238 Under this theory, a corporation can develop an
identity, pursue certain purposes defined by its board of directors, and serve
a mediating function in society between individuals and government.239
The real entity theory provides a framework for conceiving corporations
as more than mere profit-generating machines.240 Especially in closely held
corporations,241 where individual owners also participate in the

230. See Blair, supra note 225, at 799.
231. See Baworowsky, supra note 195, at 1726.
232. See id. at 1727–28.
233. See id.; see also Blair, supra note 225, at 801–02.
234. See Baworowsky, supra note 195, at 1731; see also Conestoga Wood Specialties
Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. the Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 385 (3d Cir.),
cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
235. See Blair, supra note 225, at 804.
236. See id.
237. See Baworowsky, supra note 195, at 1736.
238. See id. at 1737 (calling the corporation “a new group body naturally forming from
the cooperation of its individual members”); see also Blair, supra note 225, at 807
(explaining that scholars and courts developed this theory to account for the shareholder
becoming more of an investor than a owner).
239. See Baworowsky, supra note 195, at 1740–41 (citing ALEXIS DE TOQUEVILLE,
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 180 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba Winthrop eds. & trans., Univ.
of Chi. Press 2000) (1835)). This position is far from gaining universal acceptance,
however, as many view corporations as a source of economic inequality and societal
injustice. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, Daniel J.H. Greenwood & Erik S. Jaffe, Should
Corporations Have First Amendment Rights?, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 875, 877–81 (2007);
We the People, Not We the Corporations, MOVE TO AMEND, https://movetoamend.org (last
visited Feb. 24, 2014).
240. See Blair, supra note 225, at 819–20 (explaining that the existence of a corporate
person is necessary for companies like Facebook and Google to achieve their goals of
emphasizing “the importance of such factors as ‘culture’ and ‘reputation’ and
‘innovativeness’ in the value creating process” rather than simply acting in accordance with
a number of contracts).
241. See 1A FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 216, § 70.10 (rev. vol. 2002) (“Courts generally
identify common law close corporations by three characteristics: (1) a small number of
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management of the company, a corporate identity can emerge from the
deliberate actions of those directing the corporation.242 In the context of a
company run by those sharing a religion, “these individuals can choose to
maintain a religious identity.”243
The Supreme Court has relied on each of these theories in its various
decisions on corporate rights, so it is unclear which theory it will use to
examine corporate exercise of religion under either the Constitution or
RFRA.244 The best compass for its potential treatment of corporate religion
is its treatment of corporate speech.245 In First National Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti,246 the Court heard an argument by a corporation alleging that a
Massachusetts statute restricting use of corporate funds to influence
elections violated its free speech rights.247 At the outset of its analysis, the
Court instructed that the proper framing of the question was not whether the
corporation has the right, but rather whether the regulated activity was
something “that the First Amendment was meant to protect.”248 Certain
constitutional rights are “purely personal,” meaning that historically, only
individuals received protection under that right.249 To determine whether
the right was purely personal, the Court examined “the nature, history, and
purpose of the particular constitutional provision.”250 In its analysis of the
Free Speech Clause, the Court explained that First Amendment freedoms
comprise “fundamental components of liberty” and that speech has no
“separate source” when asserted by a corporation.251 Because of this, the
Court held that the First Amendment protected the bank and struck down
the state statute as unconstitutional.252
The Court recently upheld Bellotti in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission.253 The Citizens United Court held that the Free Speech
Clause protects a corporation’s ability to speak in the electoral context.254
Specifically, it overturned a statute that limited corporate expenditures on

shareholders; (2) no ready market for corporate stock; and (3) active shareholder
participation in the business.”).
242. See Baworowsky, supra note 195, at 1744.
243. Id.
244. See Lepard, supra note 228, at 1046.
245. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom
of speech.”).
246. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
247. See id. at 767–69.
248. Id. at 776; see also Gaylord, supra note 194, at 30. In Bellotti, the Court explained
that the issue was whether “the corporate identity of the speaker deprives this proposed
speech of what otherwise would be its clear entitlement to protection.” Bellotti, 435 U.S. at
778.
249. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778 n.14 (citing United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698–
701 (1944), for the example that the right against self-incrimination applied only to
individuals).
250. See id.
251. See id. at 780.
252. See id. at 795.
253. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
254. See id. at 365.
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speech related to elections.255 Justice Anthony Kennedy explained that the
First Amendment’s protections extend to corporations and that Bellotti’s
holding means that corporate speech does not lose constitutional protection
merely because it comes from a corporation.256 In the corporate context,
political speech decisions are made by directors through “the same rules as
ordinary business decisions.”257 In Citizens United, the corporation was a
nonprofit, but the Court explicitly stated that the Constitution forbids
suppression of the freedom of speech, regardless of whether the corporation
is for profit or not for profit.258
The Citizens United holding reflected two views of corporate
personhood: that corporations possess the aggregate rights of their
shareholders and that corporations possess autonomous rights separate from
their shareholders.259 The Court used the aggregate rights theory to
determine that corporations are essentially associations of individuals and
that restrictions on corporate speech are not permissible simply because the
source of the speech is a corporation.260 The Court also used the entity
theory of corporations by explaining that corporate political speech can
have value in the marketplace of ideas.261 Thus, under either theory, the
First Amendment protects corporate speech.
F. A New Challenge: The Affordable Care Act and Its Perceived Threat to
Religious Liberty
Current litigation alleges that certain provisions of the Affordable Care
Act substantially burden the free exercise of religion by those who provide
insurance plans to employees and students.262 The Affordable Care Act
requires group insurance plans provided by employers to ensure certain
levels of health services, including coverage without cost-sharing of
preventive care and screenings for women, according to regulations
promulgated by the Health Resource and Services Administration (HRSA)
and HHS.263 HHS sought the recommendations of the Institute of Medicine
(IOM), an arm of the National Academy of Sciences, to define guidelines

255. See id. at 365–66.
256. See id. at 342.
257. See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 220, at 87.
258. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365.
259. See Anne Tucker, Flawed Assumptions: A Corporate Law Analysis of Free Speech
and Corporate Personhood in Citizens United, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 497, 502–03
(2010).
260. See id. at 519; see also Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 342 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of
Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978)).
261. See Tucker, supra note 259, at 516–17; see also Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 364
(“On certain topics corporations may possess valuable expertise, leaving them the best
equipped to point out errors or fallacies in speech of all sorts, including the speech of
candidates and elected officials.”).
262. See infra Part II. For an overview of litigation in the federal district courts and the
early stages of appellate litigation, see generally Tan, supra note 219.
263. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (Supp. V 2011); 29 U.S.C. § 1185d.
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for women’s preventive care and screening.264 The IOM recommended that
any FDA-approved contraceptive method be part of the coverage,265 and
HHS adopted this recommendation in its rulemaking process.266
The FDA has approved twenty contraceptive methods.267 These include
barrier methods (such as condoms), hormonal methods (such as oral
contraceptives), emergency contraception (such as Plan B or ella),
implanted devices (such as intrauterine devices (IUDs)), and permanent
methods (such as vasectomies).268
The ACA and the regulatory agencies enforcing it have provided
authority for the HRSA to exempt religious employers from complying
with this law if they object to providing contraception.269 The regulation
provides that a “religious employer” is an organization that: (1) has a
purpose of inculcating religious values, (2) primarily employs those who
share its religious tenets, (3) primarily serves those who share its religious
tenets, and (4) meets the Internal Revenue Code’s definition of a nonprofit
organization.270 For these reasons, it does not cover for-profit corporations,
including closely held corporations.271
Like religious nonprofit corporations, some for-profit corporations also
state religious objections to providing contraception on the grounds that
some methods can cause a fertilized egg to fail to implant in the uterus and
that this is equivalent to facilitating an elective abortion.272 The methods to
which plaintiffs in the Tenth Circuit object, for example, include Plan B,
ella, and two IUDs.273 Other methods, which simply prevent fertilization,
may not be objectionable, depending on the religious background of the
plaintiff.274 There is medical and scientific debate concerning whether
these devices actually prevent implantation, but in Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.
v. Sebelius,275 the government conceded that certain contraceptive methods

264. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1123 (10th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
265. See id.
266. See Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of
Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg.
8725, 8725 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147).
267. See Birth Control:
Medicines To Help You, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ByAudience/ForWomen/FreePublications/ucm313215.ht
m (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
268. Id.
269. See 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(1)(a)(iv)(A) (2013).
270. Id. § 147.130(1)(a)(iv)(B).
271. See id.
272. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1124–25 (10th Cir.)
(en banc), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
273. See id.
274. See Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum.
Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 381–82 (3d Cir.) (explaining that the Mennonite plaintiffs object to
providing Plan B and ella), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013); Univ. of Notre Dame v.
Sebelius, No. 3:12-CV-253(RLM), 2012 WL 6756332, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 31, 2012)
(explaining that the Catholic plaintiffs object to all “abortifacients, contraception (when
prescribed for contraceptive purposes), and sterilization”).
275. 723 F.3d 1114.
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can prevent uterine implantation, rendering a full scientific analysis
unnecessary.276 Nevertheless, amici to the Tenth Circuit disagreed about
the effect that Plan B, ella, and IUDs have on ovulation, conception, and
implantation.277 In the brief for the Physicians for Reproductive Health and
other groups, amici explained that the scientific and legal definition of
pregnancy is implantation in the uterine lining, which can occur up to five
to nine days after fertilization of an egg by a sperm.278 Because the
emergency contraceptives at issue in Hobby Lobby almost always act before
implantation, labeling the methods “abortifacients” was improper.279 Amici
also explained that a copper, FDA-approved IUD creates a toxic
environment for sperm and that any changes to the endometrial lining
would only prevent, not disrupt, the implantation necessary to create a
scientific pregnancy.280 In contrast, amici for the plaintiff explained that
FDA-approved contraceptive methods might prevent either conception or
implantation.281 These amici explained various studies in an effort to
persuade the court that certain contraceptive methods might prevent
implantation of a fertilized cell.282 For example, they cited studies showing
that ella has the potential to impair or prevent a fertilized egg from
implanting in the uterine wall.283 They also argued that the scientific
definition of pregnancy as a fully implanted embryo does not negate the fact
that certain contraceptive methods might prevent the implantation of an
embryo.284 The plaintiffs in the HHS mandate litigation have stated that
their opposition to the HHS regulation is that it requires them to pay for
contraception that they believe can cause the death of a fertilized
embryo.285
The plaintiffs in these cases claim that requiring them to pay even part of
the fees for insurance plans that cover contraception constitutes a
substantial burden on the exercise of their religion.286 The Hobby Lobby
plaintiffs, for example, stated that their religion barred causing the death of
an embryo, and, by extension, providing certain contraceptives that could
cause an embryo to fail to implant.287 The regulation imposes a burden
276. See id. at 1123 n.3.
277. Compare Brief for Physicians for Reproductive Health et al. As Amici Curiae
Supporting Appellees, Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d 1114 (No. 12-6294), 2013 WL 1291178
[hereinafter Brief for Physicians for Reproductive Health et al.], with Brief for Ass’n of
American Physicians & Surgeons et al. As Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants, Hobby
Lobby, 723 F.3d 1114 (No. 12-6294), 2013 WL 656598 [hereinafter Brief for Ass’n of
American Physicians & Surgeons et al.].
278. See Brief for Physicians for Reproductive Health et al., supra note 277, at *9–10.
279. Id. at *11–16.
280. See id. at *16.
281. See Brief for Ass’n of American Physicians & Surgeons et al., supra note 277, at *6.
282. See id. at *7–14.
283. See id. at *11.
284. See id. *7–14.
285. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1122 (10th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
286. See Brief of Appellants at 20, Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d 1114 (No. 12-6294), 2013 WL
656599, at *20.
287. See Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1140.
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because it requires the company to participate in an activity prohibited by a
sincere religious belief, or, at the very least, substantially pressures the
company to act contrary to sincere religious beliefs.288 Such pressure
comes as a result of large, annual fines for a corporation that fails to comply
with the regulation.289 The government, in contrast, argues that the
regulation’s burden is too attenuated to be a substantial burden because the
requirement is to provide many types of insurance and because the decision
to use contraceptives is between a woman and her doctor.290
II. DISSENSION IN THE RANKS: THE CIRCUITS DIFFER ON CORPORATE
RFRA CLAIMS
The HHS mandate cases have led to deeply fractured opinions in the
circuits.291 For-profit corporate plaintiffs have sought injunctions against
application of the HHS mandate to varying degrees of success.292 Some
courts have found that corporations will not succeed on a RFRA claim.293
Other courts have found the possibility of success.294 The major source of
conflict is whether corporations are “persons” exercising religion. The
answer to this question is crucial, as RFRA contemplates strict scrutiny of
laws that substantially burden a person’s religion. The issue in these cases,
then, is a matter of statutory interpretation of the term “person” in RFRA.295
This Part examines four circuits’ answers to this question. The Tenth and
Seventh Circuits each held that secular corporations may state claims under
RFRA.296 In contrast, the Third Circuit held that corporations could not
exercise religion, barring them from stating claims under RFRA.297 The
D.C. Circuit fell between these two approaches, holding that individual
plaintiffs may state the RFRA claims of a closely held corporation.298

288. See Brief of Appellants, supra note 286, at *20–21.
289. See Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1125 (explaining that Hobby Lobby’s fine for failing
to comply would be $475 million annually).
290. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d 1114 (No. 13-354), 2013
WL 5290575, at *26.
291. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1114 (sitting en banc and resulting in six
different opinions).
292. Among other factors, a litigant seeking a preliminary injunction must prove a
likelihood of success on the merits of the claim. See, e.g., Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp.
v. Sec’y of U.S. the Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 382 (3d Cir.), cert.
granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
293. See generally Conestoga Wood, 724 F.3d at 377; Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730
F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2013); Eden Foods, Inc. v. Sebelius, 733 F.3d 626 (6th Cir. 2013).
294. See generally Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2013); Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t
of Health & Human Servs., 733 F.3d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1114.
295. See Korte, 735 F.3d at 682. An additional question is whether the distinction
between for-profit and nonprofit corporations is relevant for RFRA. See id. at 674–76.
296. See infra Part II.A.
297. See infra Part II.B.
298. See infra Part II.C.
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A. The Tenth and Seventh Circuits Hold That a For-Profit Corporation
May State a Claim Under RFRA
The Tenth and the Seventh Circuit each held that for-profit corporate
plaintiffs were “persons” exercising religion and therefore protected by
RFRA. This section examines each circuit’s opinion.
1. The Tenth Circuit Finds That RFRA Protects Corporations Through a
Textual Analysis
In Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius,299 the Court considered a RFRA
claim brought by Hobby Lobby Stores, a chain of craft stores; Mardel, Inc.,
a chain of book stores; and the family members who own both
corporations.300 Together, these corporations employed over 13,000
people.301 Five members of the Green family owned and ran both chains
according to their Christian beliefs, as described in Hobby Lobby’s
statement of purpose, which recited the family’s commitment to operating
their business according to biblical principles.302 Their managerial
decisions stemmed from their faith.303 For example, the stores did not open
on Sundays, and Hobby Lobby placed evangelistic advertisements in
newspapers.304 Moreover, their corporate structure included a management
trust that had religious requirements: “The trust exists ‘to honor God with
all that has been entrusted’ to the Greens and to ‘use the Green family assets
to create, support, and leverage the efforts of Christian ministries.’”305
The plaintiffs objected to the HHS mandate because their faith included
the belief that the fertilization of an egg by a sperm is the beginning of
human life and that facilitating acts that cause a human embryo to die was
immoral.306 In light of this belief, the plaintiffs sought relief from
enforcement of the mandate as applied to four307 of the FDA-approved
contraceptive methods that they believed prevented uterine implantation.308
If Hobby Lobby and Mardel failed to comply with the regulation, each
would be exposed to tax penalties, regulatory activity, and possible
lawsuits.309 The regulatory taxes, for example, would amount to $100 per
day for each uncovered individual.310 Because the plan covered more than
299. 723 F.3d 1114.
300. See id. 1120.
301. See id. at 1122.
302. See id.
303. See id.
304. See id.
305. See id.
306. See id. at 1122–23.
307. The plaintiffs did not object to contraception generally, as a Catholic organization
might, see supra note 18, but rather objected only to four of the twenty FDA-approved
methods. See Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1144.
308. See Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1125. The government did not dispute the sincerity of
this belief. See id.
309. See id. (citing 26 U.S.C. §§ 4980D, 4980H (Supp. V 2011); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132,
1185d).
310. See id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 4980D(b)(1)).
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13,000 individuals, this would be a fine of almost $475 million annually.311
Alternatively, the plaintiffs could have eliminated health insurance
coverage and would face penalties of $26 million annually.312
a. Statutory Analysis Indicates That RFRA’s “Person”
Includes Corporations
The Tenth Circuit held that the corporate plaintiffs were “persons” who
may state a claim under RFRA, and a plurality found that these plaintiffs
were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim.313 The government
advanced two arguments that Hobby Lobby and Mardel did not fall under
RFRA’s scope. First, it argued that the existence of religious exemptions
for nonprofit organizations in civil rights and labor laws indicated that
Congress intended RFRA to carry forward a distinction between for-profit
and nonprofit organizations.314 Second, the government argued that the forprofit/nonprofit distinction came from the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
and that Congress did not intend for RFRA to expand the Free Exercise
Clause’s scope.315
The court rejected both arguments as a matter of statutory
interpretation.316 Because RFRA did not specifically define “person,” the
court relied on the Dictionary Act’s default definition, which includes
corporations unless the statute’s context dictates otherwise.317 Contrary to
the government’s position, RFRA’s context did not include statutes that
explicitly provided only for religious nonprofit exemptions.318 The court
explained that exemptions for religious organizations in such acts as Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964319 and the Americans with Disabilities
Act320 (ADA) show that Congress “knows how to craft a corporate
religious exemption.”321 The court claimed that to state that Congress
intended to carry forward Title VII and the ADA’s distinction without
expressly providing so is to strain the text.322 Thus, the default Dictionary
Act definition applied, and RFRA protected the corporate plaintiffs.323
311. Id.
312. See id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 4980H).
313. Id. at 1120–21. The Tenth Circuit remanded to the district court to evaluate the
other preliminary injunction factors, which it did, granting the injunction. See Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 12-1000-HE, 2013 WL 3869832, at *2 (W.D. Okla. July 19,
2013).
314. See Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1128–29.
315. See id.
316. See id. at 1129.
317. See id.; see also 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
318. See Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1129–30.
319. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006).
320. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
321. See Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1130; cf. Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 676 (7th
Cir. 2013) (“If Congress intended a nonprofit limitation in RFRA, surely that would be some
hint of it in the statutory text.”).
322. See Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1129–30. The Court characterized this reading this
way: “In short, the government believes Congress used ‘person’ in RFRA as extreme
shorthand for something like ‘natural person or ‘religious organization’ as that term was
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b. Constitutional Principles of Free Exercise Do Not Require Excluding
For-Profit Corporations From RFRA’s Protection
The court next addressed the argument that Congress’s understanding of
the Free Exercise Clause informed its passage of RFRA, and that this
understanding precluded protection of for-profit corporations.324 The court
rejected this analysis on the grounds that RFRA’s purpose was to restore
the pre-Smith balancing test for whether a neutral law of general
applicability can withstand a strict scrutiny analysis to justifiably burden
religious exercise.325 Congress did not intend to alter who could bring a
claim under pre-Smith free exercise jurisprudence, which included the
guarantee to protect associations and not just individuals.326 The protection
of associational freedom is important for protecting other individual
liberties.327 Moreover, the First Amendment protects such associations as
churches, which incorporate.328
The court rejected the government’s bright-line approach that precludes a
RFRA claim for a corporation that does not have nonprofit status through
the Internal Revenue Service.329 This, the court explained, cannot be a
position rooted in the First Amendment, because its drafters rejected the
term “conscience” in favor of “exercise.”330 The chosen term carried a
connotation of action and thus protected “religiously motivated conduct, as
well as religious belief.”331 In light of this action-oriented history, the court
rejected the argument that incorporation alters First Amendment rights
while individuals maintain protection.332 The court also rejected the district
court’s argument that a business corporation cannot partake in “religiouslymotivated actions separate and apart from the intention and direction of

used in exemptions for religious organizations as set forth in Title VII, the ADA, and the
NLRA.’” Id. at 1130.
323. See id. at 1132.
324. See id. at 1133.
325. See id.
326. See id. (“An individual’s freedom to speak, to worship, and to petition the
government for the redress of grievances could not be vigorously protected from interference
by the State unless a correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward those ends were
not also guaranteed.” (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984))).
327. Id. at 1133; see also Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 342–43 (2010)
(explaining that the Court does not accept the argument that corporate First Amendment
rights do not differ “simply because such associations are not ‘natural persons’”).
328. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1134. (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 525 (1993)). In addition, the Supreme Court has decided free
exercise cases for individuals running for-profit businesses. See supra Part I.E.1.
329. See Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1134.
330. See id.
331. See id. (citing McConnell, supra note 22, at 1488–89). An additional distinction
between conscience and religion is the corporate or institutional aspect of religious belief.
See id. at 1134–35 (citing McConnell, supra note 22, at 1490). The court also noted that free
exercise includes proselytizing. See id. (citing Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877
(1990)).
332. See id. at 1134–35 (“[W]e see no reason why one must orient one’s business toward
a religious community to preserve Free Exercise protections.”).

1984

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

their individual actors.”333 This could not be right, according to the court,
because churches and other entities that incorporate clearly exercise
religion.334 RFRA thus includes corporations in its definitions, because the
for-profit/nonprofit distinction is irrelevant.
2. The Seventh Circuit Agreed That a Secular Corporation Could Invoke
RFRA’s Protection
Using a similar analysis to the Hobby Lobby court, the Seventh Circuit
held that secular corporations could challenge the HHS mandate.335 In
Korte v. Sebelius,336 the court heard a consolidated appeal involving two
for-profit corporations.337 The first, Korte & Luitjohan Contractors, Inc.,
was a closely held construction company that employs ninety full-time
workers.338 Cyril and Jane Korte were the majority shareholders of K&L
Contractors, as well as its only officers and directors.339 As Catholics, they
believed that artificial contraception and abortifacient drugs were contrary
to their religion and objected to providing any health plan that facilitated
the use of such contraceptive methods.340 To emphasize this objection, the
couple, acting in their managerial capacity, enacted ethical guidelines
describing limits on employee healthcare benefits.341 Failing to comply
with the HHS mandate would result in penalties totaling $730,000
annually.342
In the second case, the corporate plaintiffs were Grote Industries, Inc.,
which acted as the managing member for Grote Industries, LLC, which
manufactures vehicle safety systems.343 Six individually named plaintiffs,
along with other family members, fully owned Grote Industries, Inc.344 The
individual plaintiffs were the officers and directors of the corporation.345
Grote Industries employed 464 employees in the United States and
provided a self-insured healthcare plan that did not carry contraception and
sterilization procedures before the HHS mandate became law.346 The
plaintiffs managed Grote in accordance with their Catholic faith, objected to
the mandate in light of that faith, and would face an annual penalty of
nearly $17 million for failing to comply.347
333. Id. at 1136 (quoting Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278,
1291 (W.D. Okla. 2012)).
334. See id. (citing Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546
U.S. 418 (2006)).
335. See Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 659 (7th Cir. 2013).
336. 735 F.3d 654.
337. See id. at 659.
338. See id. at 662.
339. See id.
340. Id. at 662–63.
341. See id. at 663.
342. See id.
343. See id. at 663–64.
344. See id. at 663 n.6.
345. See id. at 664.
346. See id.
347. See id.

2014]

CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND CONTRACEPTIVES

1985

Judge Diane S. Sykes began her opinion by explaining the breadth of
RFRA, including its applicability to all federal law unless Congress
explicitly excludes application of RFRA to a statute.348 RFRA, she
explained, should alleviate “the inevitable clashes between religious
freedom and the realities of the modern welfare state.”349 Against this
backdrop, the court examined the meaning of “person” in RFRA by
invoking the Dictionary Act.350 In its analysis, the court sought to
determine whether allowing secular corporations to be “persons” for RFRA
would be a poor fit with the statute’s purposes, and it held that because
some corporations qualify for RFRA protection, the corporations in this
litigation could qualify as well.351 As evidence of this claim, the court
pointed to Gonzales,352 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.,353 and the
HHS mandate exemption for religious organizations.354 Like the Tenth
Circuit, Judge Sykes rejected the government’s argument that RFRA
carried forward the for-profit/nonprofit distinction within Title VII and the
ADA.355
Instead, the court examined the history of RFRA and free exercise more
broadly to see if any pre-Smith cases rejected secular corporations’ ability
to exercise religion.356 Recognizing that the question of secular corporate
religious exercise was novel,357 the Korte court nonetheless explained that
unless something about seeking profit hinders the ability to practice
religion, “a faith-based, for-profit corporation can claim free-exercise
protection to the extent that an aspect of its conduct is religiously
motivated.”358 An examination of Thomas, Sherbert, Braunfeld, and Lee
showed that individuals in the pursuit of profit had their claims examined
by the Supreme Court—not for standing, but on the merits of the
argument.359

348. See id. at 673 (“The Affordable Care Act does not explicitly exclude application of
RFRA.”).
349. See id. (citing Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretative
Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 39 VILL. L. REV. 1, 25–26 (1994)).
350. See id. at 673–74.
351. See id. at 674 (“A corporation is just a special form of organizational association.
No one doubts that organizational associations can engage in religious practice. The
government accepts that some corporations—religious nonprofits—have religious-exercise
rights under both RFRA and the Free-Exercise Clause.”).
352. 546 U.S. 418 (2006) (incorporated religious sect).
353. 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (incorporated church).
354. See 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a) (2013) (granting an exemption with or without
incorporated status).
355. See Korte, 735 F.3d at 675–79 (explaining that Title VII and the ADA’s nonprofit
exemptions rely on the church autonomy doctrine that provides complete immunity to
religious organizations from compliance with these laws); cf. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 704 (2012).
356. See Korte, 735 F.3d at 679.
357. See id. (citing Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. 641, 643 (2012)
(Sotomayor, Circuit Justice) (denying an extraordinary writ on grounds including the novelty
of the issue presented)).
358. See id.
359. See id. at 679–80.

1986

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

The court further rejected the government’s argument by rebuking its
attempt to cast United States v. Lee as dispositive of the claim that for-profit
corporations cannot pursue religious exercise.360 The Lee Court stated:
Congress and the courts have been sensitive to the needs flowing from the
Free Exercise Clause, but every person cannot be shielded from all the
burdens incident to exercising every aspect of the right to practice
religious beliefs. When followers of a particular sect enter into
commercial activity as a matter of choice, the limits they accept on their
own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are not to be
superimposed on the statutory schemes which are binding on others in
that activity.361

Judge Sykes called the government’s interpretation of this passage “a fartoo-narrow view of religious freedom,” because it assumes that the religious
believer compartmentalizes his or her life.362
Having explained that neither the Supreme Court’s free exercise
jurisprudence nor RFRA’s text precluded for-profit corporate religious
exercise, the court turned to the Supreme Court’s “general jurisprudence of
corporate constitutional rights” and found that nothing automatically limits
such rights to nonprofit corporations.363 The Korte court took note of the
Supreme Court’s decisions granting and withholding certain constitutional
rights to all corporations364 and explained that Bellotti was the closest thing
to a proper decision framework.365 Namely, if the right in question has a
historical function of guaranteeing rights to individuals only, the provision
in question will not be available to corporations.366 Because the issue at
bar, however, was strictly statutory, the court declined to further analyze the
free exercise rights of the corporate plaintiffs.367
Based on all of these findings, the Korte court held that K&L Contractors
and Grote Industries could state RFRA claims.368 In dicta, the court
seemed to limit its holding to closely held corporations, because the
individual owners set company policy as its directors, and they are
intimately involved in directing the company.369 Both the Seventh and the
Tenth Circuits, therefore, held that RFRA covered corporate claimants in
light of the statute’s text and purpose.

360. See id. at 680.
361. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982) (emphasis added).
362. See Korte, 735 F.3d at 681; see also Christiansen, supra note 224, at 30 (explaining
that the business judgment rule allows directors to make decisions in the interests of
nonshareholders).
363. See Korte, 735 F.3d at 681.
364. See id. at 681–82.
365. See id. at 682 (citing First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 (1978)).
366. See id.
367. See id.
368. See id.
369. See id. at 682 n.17 (dictum). Judge Sykes implied that in a larger corporation,
ownership will be separate from controllers, and will have more members of the board,
presumably making it more difficult to define religious beliefs. See id.
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B. The Third Circuit Holds That a For-Profit Corporation Cannot
Exercise Religion
In contrast to the Hobby Lobby and Korte courts, the Third Circuit
disagreed that for-profit corporations receive RFRA’s protection.370 In
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Secretary of the U.S. Department of
Health & Human Services,371 the individual plaintiffs were members of the
Hahn family, which was Mennonite.372 The family owned 100 percent of
the shares of a corporation that manufactured wood cabinets and employed
950 workers.373 As Mennonites, the Hahns believed that it was intrinsically
evil and a sin to take a human life, including the termination of a fertilized
embryo.374 In light of this belief, the Hahns and Conestoga objected to
providing Plan B and ella, which the plaintiffs believed could cause a
fertilized embryo to fail to implant in a woman’s uterus.375
1. The Third Circuit Rejects For-Profit Corporations’ Ability To Exercise
Religion Under the First Amendment
The Third Circuit began its analysis with the issue of whether
corporations can exercise religion under the First Amendment. The
plaintiffs suggested two theories: (1) that a corporation can exercise
religion directly under the First Amendment, and (2) that a corporation can
exercise religion indirectly by asserting the owners’ rights under a theory
established by the Ninth Circuit.376
a. The Direct Exercise of Religion by a Corporation
Conestoga premised its direct exercise theory on Citizens United, which
held that the First Amendment applied to corporations in the context of a
free speech case.377 Corporations may exercise a number of constitutional
rights,378 but the guarantee must not be one that is “purely personal.”379
The Third Circuit examined Bellotti’s relationship to Citizens United and
explained that the latter’s holding was specific to the Court’s history of
protecting corporate free speech.380 Moreover, free speech cases pose a
370. See Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 385 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
371. 724 F.3d 377.
372. See id. at 381.
373. See id.
374. Id. at 381–82; see also First Amended Verified Complaint ¶ 92, Conestoga Wood,
724 F.3d 377 (No. 13-1144), 2013 WL 6181041 (explaining that the Board of Directors of
Conestoga adopted “The Hahn Family Statement on the Sanctity of Human Life,” which
explains the family’s belief that life begins at conception and their moral opposition to
participating in any act involving the termination of human life).
375. See Conestoga Wood, 724 F.3d at 382.
376. See id. at 383.
377. See id.
378. See id.
379. See id. at 384 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778
(1978)).
380. See id.
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separate analytical and interpretive framework than free exercise cases.381
The Conestoga court, therefore, found that Bellotti had no influence on the
HHS mandate cases.382 For these reasons, it found that Bellotti’s “nature,
history, and purpose” test was not met for corporate free exercise rights.383
The court particularly emphasized a corporation’s inability to hold
religious beliefs.384 In addition, it distinguished cases relied on in the
petitioners’ and dissent’s arguments that showed recent Supreme Court
cases allowing free exercise claims by religious organizations.385 These
cases were inapposite for the majority because none involved a for-profit
corporation.386 Religious organizations are a means through which
individuals can practice their religion, and that such organizations receive
protection within the Free Exercise Clause is not determinative for forprofit corporations.387
b. The Third Circuit Rejects the Ninth Circuit’s Pass-Through Method
After dispensing with the plaintiffs’ first theory, the Court examined their
second theory. The plaintiffs cited two cases from the Ninth Circuit388 that
allowed closely held corporations to state the free exercise claims of their
owners.389 Under this “pass-through theory,” the Ninth Circuit explained
that closely held corporations may convey by extension the beliefs of the
family members who own them.390 The corporate plaintiffs in these cases
did not have any free exercise rights separate from or greater than their

381. See id. at 386.
382. See id. at 385.
383. See id. (“We do not see how a for-profit ‘artificial being, invisible, intangible, and
existing only in contemplation of law,’ that was created to make money could exercise such
an inherently ‘human’ right.” (quoting Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pataki, 292 F.3d
338, 346 (2d Cir. 2002))).
384. See id. (“It might also be added that corporations have no consciences, no beliefs, no
feelings, no thoughts, no desires.” (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 588 U.S. 310, 466
(2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part))); Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 223 (1963); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1291
(W.D. Okla. 2012) (“General business corporations do not, separate and apart from the
actions or belief systems of their individual owners or employees, exercise religion. They do
not pray, worship, observe sacraments or take other religiously-motivated actions separate
and apart from the intention and direction of their individual actors.”), rev’d, 723 F.3d 1114
(10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
385. See Conestoga Wood, 724 F.3d at 385–86.
386. See id.
387. See id. at 386.
388. See id. at 386–87 (citing EEOC v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610 (9th
Cir. 1988), which held that for-profit corporations can assert the free exercise claims of their
owners, and Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2009), which affirmed
Townley).
389. See id.
390. See Townley, 859 F.2d at 619 (“Townley is merely the instrument through and by
which Mr. and Mrs. Townley express their religious beliefs.”); Stormans, 586 F.3d at 1120
(“Stormans, Inc. does not present any free exercise rights of its own different from or greater
than its owners’ rights. We hold that, as in Townley, Stormans has standing to assert the free
exercise rights of its owners.”).
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owners’ rights.391 The Third Circuit rejected this analysis, claiming it rested
on a faulty analysis of the corporate form, which creates a distinct entity.392
In exchange for limited liability, the corporate owner gives up certain
prerogatives.393 The pass-through theory, in contrast, ignores this separate
legal entity.394 On this basis, the Third Circuit found that the pass-through
theory was legally incorrect, and that the mandate’s burden falls squarely on
Conestoga and not the Hahns.395 Because Conestoga itself cannot exercise
religion, it has no free exercise recourse to seek an exemption from the
mandate.396
2. The Third Circuit Rejects Corporate Personhood for Purposes of RFRA
The Third Circuit also rejected Conestoga’s ability to state a RFRA claim
with a brief, plain-language analysis. Because the statute is for a “person’s
exercise of religion,” and because the court held that a corporation cannot
exercise religion under the Free Exercise Clause,397 it also held that a
corporation is unable to state a claim under RFRA.398
C. The D.C. Circuit Holds That the Owners of a Closely Held Corporation
Can Assert a RFRA Claim on Behalf of the Corporation
In Gilardi v. United States Department of Health & Human Services,399
the D.C. Circuit held that the individual plaintiffs who owned the corporate
plaintiff could state a RFRA claim on behalf of their corporation, although
it rejected the Ninth Circuit’s pass-through theory.400 The individual
plaintiffs were two brothers who owned two companies equally.401
Freshway Foods and Freshway Logistics together employed 400 people,
who could participate in a self-insured health plan.402 As Catholics, the
Gilardi brothers opposed the coverage mandated by the HHS regulation, but
failure to provide it to their employers would result in fines amounting to
over $14 million annually.403
Judge Janice Rogers Brown first analyzed whether the corporate
plaintiffs could state a claim under RFRA.404 She took note of the Hobby
Lobby court’s opinion but explained that its analysis of the term “person,”
relying on the Dictionary Act, was too narrow.405 Rather, she explained,
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.

See Conestoga Wood, 724 F.3d at 387–88 (citing Stormans, 586 F.3d at 1120).
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 388.
See id.
See id.
See id.
733 F.3d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
See id. at 1214–15.
See id. at 1210.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1211.
See id.
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the proper focus is on a “person’s exercise of religion”406 rather than
“person” alone.407 The court therefore examined the full free exercise
jurisprudence to determine the “nature, history, and purpose” of the Free
Exercise Clause and whether it applied to a secular corporation.408 Noting
that the clause protected “exercise” rather than merely “conscience,”409 the
court found that the clause’s protection extended to conduct undertaken
either individually or institutionally.410 Indeed, the clause regularly
protected individuals and religious organizations.411 No Supreme Court
case had yet held, however, that a secular corporation could exercise
religion.412 The Gilardi court thus refused to extend the free exercise right
directly to the secular corporations, even if corporations might receive that
right in the future.413 Here, Judge Brown noted that Citizens United was
the culmination of decades of case law.414 The free exercise cases, on the
other hand, militated against extending the free exercise right directly to
corporations.415
Like the Third Circuit, the D.C. Circuit rejected the Ninth Circuit’s passthrough theory416 as legally “dubious.”417 Rather, the court held that the
Gilardis have standing to sue because they are shareholders of the
corporation injured separately from the corporation, and because the
corporation did not have the capacity to sue for relief separately.418
Although the government argued that incorporation always involves
creating a distinct legal entity for which the owners forego certain rights,
the court explained that an important part of this rights bargain is that
corporations “can generally exercise some analogue of the forgone
right.”419 In the case of free exercise, then, if the corporation cannot
exercise that right, the shareholder should not give up the right upon
incorporation.420 To hold otherwise would cause an important right to
“disappear[] into the ether” depending on how a person ran his or her

406. RFRA defines the exercise of religion by referring to the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act, which states that “‘religious exercise’ includes any exercise of
religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2006).
407. See Gilardi, 733 F.3d at 1211 (citing Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 644, 668 (D.C. Cir.
2008)).
408. See id. at 1212.
409. Id.
410. See id. at 1212–13 (explaining that the word “religion” carries a connotation of a
community of believers).
411. See id. at 1212–14 (collecting free exercise cases).
412. See id. at 1213. But see id. (“But that the Court has never seriously considered such a
claim by a secular corporation or other organizational entity is not to say it never will.”).
413. Id. at 1214.
414. See id.
415. See id.
416. See id. at 1214–15.
417. See id. at 1215.
418. See id. at 1215–16.
419. See id. at 1218.
420. See id.
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business.421 Judge Brown rejected the government’s argument because she
could not believe that Congress intended free exercise rights to disappear
when it instituted RFRA’s compelling interest balancing test.422
III. FINDING THE PROPER FRAMEWORK: PUTTING STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION BEFORE CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
This Note proposes two approaches for the issue of whether secular
corporations are “persons” protected by RFRA. First, agreeing with the
Tenth and Seventh Circuits, it proposes that the absence of case law
examining free exercise claims by for-profit corporations is not, as some
suggest, dispositive of the cases currently under review in the federal
courts.423 Based on the Dictionary Act’s “context” requirement and a
proper Bellotti analysis, certain for-profit corporations should be able to
state RFRA claims, and the federal courts should continue building a
jurisprudence to determine the contours of such claims. Second, this Note
proposes that even if the Supreme Court completely forecloses the
possibility for any corporation to have rights under RFRA, the D.C.
Circuit’s approach to allowing the shareholders to state a claim under
RFRA is correct, because it comports with the nation’s broad protections of
religious freedom in accordance with formal theories of corporate law.424
A. The Context of RFRA and the Nature, History, and Purpose of the Free
Exercise Clause Do Not Preclude Corporate RFRA Claims
RFRA is a “super-statute” implementing Congress’s interpretation of the
Free Exercise Clause by incorporating a particular jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court.425 Interpreters of the statute, then, must be careful not to
intertwine the necessary statutory and constitutional analyses. Courts will
properly take notice of pre-Smith jurisprudence and adjudicate the HHS
mandate cases according to principles of substantial burden and compelling
interests that are outside the scope of this Note.426 In terms of who can
bring claims under the statute, however, RFRA’s terms must govern, and
RFRA grants judicial relief to persons burdened in their religious
exercise.427 Unless the government can rebut the Dictionary Act’s
presumption that the word “person” includes corporations, the corporate
plaintiffs should be able to directly state RFRA claims.428 This section
explains why congressional intent, textual interpretation, and legislative
history support corporations’ ability to state RFRA claims and concludes
that the federal judiciary should begin developing a jurisprudence of
corporate RFRA rights.
421.
422.
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1. Context Matters: Congress’s Intent To Restore the Pre-Smith Regime
Determining who are the “persons” exercising religion under RFRA
requires a proper statutory analysis. This Note suggests that the analytic
frameworks of the Seventh and Tenth Circuits and the Third Circuit present
opposite forms of analysis, and that the former frames the issue correctly.
The Hobby Lobby and Korte courts first approached the HHS mandate issue
by determining what RFRA protected and then by analyzing its text and
purpose.429 In contrast, the Conestoga court proceeded directly to the Free
Exercise Clause, determined that the clause failed the Bellotti test for
protecting corporations, and determined that corporations could receive
neither constitutional nor statutory protection.430 The framework matters
because RFRA appears to place a wider fence around religious liberty than
the Smith Court did in its explanation of the Free Exercise Clause.431 In
theory, this will help religious actors avoid clashes between their beliefs
and the regulatory state.432
The context of a RFRA analysis should include an understanding of what
the statute aimed to restore.433 From Sherbert to Smith, the courts engaged
in an enterprise that looked similar to a common law adjudicative
process434 that entertained individual claims, resulting in a jurisprudence
that later courts could apply.435 Unlike a true common law system,
however, the Sherbert line of cases carried the imprimatur of constitutional
prescription.436 The Smith Court rejected the Sherbert compelling interest
test in part because it believed that judges were not suited to make the type
of case-by-case balancing determinations required by Sherbert.437 Using its
own considered judgment of the Constitution, Congress enacted RFRA
against the background of Smith precisely to instruct courts that they should
make such determinations in the first instance, because Congress believed
that Smith would not otherwise provide satisfactory protection of
Americans’ religious liberty.438 To rectify the wrong it perceived,
Congress’s legislation instructed courts to use a balancing test that
measured the government’s compelling interest against the alleged burden
on believers’ exercise of their religion.439 This concept of legislative
accommodation has existed since colonial days440 and reinforces the

429. See supra Part II.A.
430. See supra Part II.B.1.
431. See supra notes 127–28 and accompanying text. But see discussion supra note 147
(explaining that whether Congress intended to expand or restore pre-Smith doctrine is a
subject of debate that could affect the resolution of the merits of the HHS mandate cases).
432. See supra note 349.
433. See supra note 147.
434. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
435. See supra Part I.B.1.
436. See supra note 88.
437. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
438. See supra Part I.C.
439. See supra Part I.C.
440. See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text.
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American dedication to religious liberty beyond mere toleration.441 In
addition, it mirrors the understanding—again dating from colonial times—
that compelling government interests justify burdening religious
exercise.442
RFRA thus restores not only the strict scrutiny regime articulated in
Sherbert and Yoder, but also restores the common law model in which
courts can and should examine particular claims in light of previous
claims.443 This determination involves asking whether the new claim is
similar enough to previous claims, and, if so, to extend the law’s
protection.444 If it is not similar enough, a court can distinguish and dismiss
the claim. Courts making such determinations should take account of cases
in which courts granted exemptions,445 in addition to cases where courts
found that a law was not a substantial burden or where the government
satisfied the compelling interest test.446
2. “Person” v. “Person’s Exercise of Religion”: The Result Is the Same
By understanding this background, it becomes clear that the Seventh and
Tenth Circuits’ analysis of persons covered by RFRA is stronger than the
Third Circuit’s approach. The analysis at this phase of the HHS mandate
litigation requires statutory interpretation of RFRA rather than a discussion
of the Free Exercise Clause’s contours. The key issue in each case is
whether RFRA’s “person” exercising religion includes secular, for-profit
corporations. Because the statute does not define this operative term, courts
must analyze RFRA’s context to determine if the default definition447 that
includes corporations, partnerships, trusts, and other associations is
appropriate, in accordance with the Dictionary Act. Regardless of how
broadly courts construe RFRA’s “context,” corporations arguably fall
within RFRA’s reach.
a. Most Narrow Interpretation: Purely Textual Analysis and
the Dictionary Act
At the most narrow level of interpretation, a court will look purely within
the statute’s text.448 “Person” standing alone would clearly receive the
Dictionary Act’s default definition, because nothing in the text explicitly
disclaims application to corporations.449 The Court’s artificial person
canon bolsters this position.450 As used in RFRA, however, the word
person includes the modification “person’s exercise of religion,” so the
441.
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Dictionary’s Act context requirement might entail a broader approach.451
The federal courts’ definition of exercise of religion is any conduct that is
motivated by a religious belief,452 and the Free Exercise Clause
undoubtedly protects both individual and institutional religious exercise.453
The corporations involved in this litigation pass this test through their
actions, which include proselytization, charitable giving, closing on holy
days, and providing health insurance plans that may withhold drugs and
devices contrary to certain religious beliefs.454 These are religiously
motivated actions that either for-profit or nonprofit corporations can take.
In addition, protecting corporations generally fits within the purposes of
RFRA: among other things, Congress intended to protect those who
engaged in activities that a secular government would not deem “religious”
but which might be important to the claimant acting in accordance with a
belief.455
The obvious objection here is that the corporation itself does not have
beliefs.456 This objection, however, fails to appreciate that a board of
directors can direct—and many in this litigation have directed—the
corporation’s bylaws, ethical statements, or statements of purpose to
include religious tenets in accordance with which the corporation operates.
This is similar to the free speech context, where a corporation’s “speech”
comes from the direction of its officers and directors in their
decisionmaking capacity.457 No special rules or laws govern corporate
speech; it is the corporation itself that “speaks” at the direction of its
board.458 Similarly, here, when corporate directors institute bylaws,
statements, or guidelines, they define corporate beliefs upon which a
corporation can act. This is true of secular corporations, such as Whole
Foods, Chipotle, and Facebook, seeking to institute a specific moral culture,
and it is true of faith-based corporations, such as Hobby Lobby, seeking to
institute a specific religious culture.459 An imperfect analogy is that the
directors and officers are the “conscience” of the corporation because they
direct conduct in accordance with religious belief.460
b. Most Broad Interpretation: The Entire Free Exercise
Jurisprudence and Bellotti
Even at the broadest possible level of context—the Supreme Court’s
entire free exercise jurisprudence—the argument that RFRA can include
corporations succeeds.
Because application of RFRA to for-profit
451.
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corporations is a novel question, the best indication of how the Court would
analyze this approach is the Bellotti test.461 Here, again, the Tenth and
Seventh Circuits more fully captured the spirit of religious liberty than the
Third Circuit. Bellotti instructs that application of a certain constitutional
provision depends on whether the provision is “purely personal,” as
measured by the nature, history, and purpose of the clause.462 The Third
Circuit examined the history of the Free Exercise Clause and correctly
found that the Supreme Court has never found that a secular corporation can
exercise religion.463 This analysis, however, is incomplete because it fails
to consider the nature and purpose prongs of Bellotti and relies almost
exclusively on the history prong.464 This leads to a weak appreciation of
instances in which individuals pursuing profit successfully petitioned courts
for relief from laws that burdened their religious practice.465 In addition,
the Third Circuit’s analysis of the nature and purpose of religious liberty is
lacking, because it fails to appreciate that the nature of free exercise is to
protect conduct more broadly than conscience.466 Moreover, additional
purposes of religious liberty are to ensure that government does not
encroach on religion467 and to maintain the vibrant pluralism that has been
part of the American fabric since the nation’s founding.468 Instead, the
Conestoga court simply held that no prior cases of constitutional corporate
religious exercise469 meant no future cases of statutory corporate religious
exercise.470 The Conestoga court’s rejection of Bellotti471 was premature
because Bellotti contained language about corporate First Amendment
rights generally, and not just about the Free Speech Clause.472 RFRA, in
turn, explicitly instructs courts to engage in an assessment of free exercise
claims according to pre-Smith jurisprudence, which includes the potential
for a Bellotti analysis. The Third Circuit, therefore, missed a crucial part of
the analysis by engaging in a purely constitutional and historical discussion
and not engaging with RFRA’s text.
The Hobby Lobby, Korte, and Gilardi courts provided a more robust
analysis of the nature, history, and purpose of what the right to free exercise
protects.473 Indeed, they addressed the issue in the manner that the Bellotti
court instructed: by analyzing what the right protects, rather than whether a
corporation can claim that right.474 The Conestoga court did exactly the
opposite. A Bellotti analysis should take account of what Congress would
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know in legislating RFRA: America’s commitment to religious liberty
from colonial days,475 the fact that free exercise protects conduct over
conscience,476 the long-standing definition of “persons” as including
corporations unless otherwise specified,477 and past statutes that show
Congress knows how to create corporate or religious exemptions.478 The
Tenth and Seventh Circuits incorporate these principles and show how
RFRA can and should cover at least some corporations.
The government’s position includes distinguishing between for-profit and
nonprofit corporations and calling that distinction determinative.479 The
practice of allowing nonprofit corporations to state claims for violations of
their free exercise of religion during the Sherbert regime, however, shows
that the mere act of incorporation does not destroy religious liberty.480
Moreover, a profit motive cannot be determinative, as the Supreme Court
has allowed individual business owners to state free exercise claims.481 In
addition, as a normative matter, First Amendment issues can trump formal
issues concerning the corporate form.482 Each of these points form a part of
the pre-Smith jurisprudence that Congress restored with RFRA, and nothing
in that jurisprudence expressly excludes for-profit corporations.
Rather, Congress wanted courts to engage in a balancing act of RFRA’s
contours, and it firmly offered its support to religious liberty by enacting a
strict scrutiny test. This is the important context for Bellotti purposes and
should inform any analysis of RFRA.
3. A Brief Note on Legislative History
Some have noted that RFRA’s legislative history, such as its committee
reports, does not mention its application to corporations.483 Few, however,
have noted that prior versions of RFRA introduced in Congress did, in fact,
define the persons the statute meant to protect.484 Prior legislative history is
frequently an unreliable source of legislative intent,485 especially in the
absence of materials explaining changes and amendments, but RFRA’s
history may present a plausible lesson to a judge willing to engage in this
form of analysis. At a minimum, the prior versions of the statute show that
475. See supra Part I.A.
476. See supra Part I.B.
477. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
478. See supra notes 319–21 and accompanying text.
479. See supra notes 314–15 and accompanying text.
480. See supra Part I.E.2.
481. See supra Part I.E.1.
482. See supra notes 246–61 and accompanying text.
483. See Steven D. Smith & Caroline Mala Corbin, Debate, The Contraception Mandate
and Religious Freedom, 161 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 261, 270 (2013), available at
http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/161-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-261.pdf.
484. See supra note 142. For others recognizing the definition of “persons” in proposed
RFRAs, see Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Politics at the Pulpit: Tax Benefits, Substantial Burdens,
and Institutional Free Exercise, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1137, 1211 (2009), and Caroline Mala
Corbin, Corporate Religious Liberty (August 2013) (manuscript at 19–20), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2327919.
485. See supra note 142.
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Congress at times contemplated defining “person.” In the initial draft,
RFRA protected individuals and religious organizations, corporations, and
associations.486 The next version omitted the religious modifier and,
without any modification, protected individuals, corporations,
organizations, associations, and other entities.487 This analysis yields the
argument that successive versions of the proposed statute protected
respectively larger categories of potential claimants. The initial version
protected individuals and religious groups; the next version dropped the
religious modifier, seemingly offering the proposed statute’s protection to a
broader constituency. Indeed, the potential claimants in the second version
would largely mirror those protected if the word “person” were not defined
and the default Dictionary Act definition applied. Congress plausibly
dropped the definition to avoid excess language where the Dictionary Act
would apply.
4. The Corporate Form and Its Relevance to the HHS Mandate
Notably, the Court’s corporate First Amendment jurisprudence has not
settled on a theory of corporate personhood. Indeed, in 2010, the Citizens
United Court appeared to rely on two different theories to reach its
holding.488 RFRA could accommodate either theory. If the Court relies on
the contractual theory that views a corporation as an association of
shareholders, it could hold that a closely held corporation can exercise
religion in much the same way it has allowed churches or religious groups
to state RFRA and free exercise claims.489 The Court has not previously
held that the mere act of incorporation restricts such a claim. If the Court
uses the real entity theory of corporations, then corporate religious exercise,
such as proselytizing through advertisements or refusing to fund
contraception through insurance plans, is religious conduct performed
directly by the corporation.490 The individuals who direct the corporation
would elect to maintain such a religious entity.491
5. Why the Common Law Model Is Crucial
Having explored whether RFRA’s context precludes corporations from
stating RFRA claims, this Note returns again to the common law model
Congress directed the courts to create. Two points will reinforce that this
analysis of corporate RFRA rights has important limits.
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a. Congress Has the Final Say
First, if courts allow secular corporations to state RFRA claims, then
Congress can react. It did, after all, expressly legislate a balancing test to
replace the Supreme Court’s abandoned, constitutionally compelled
Sherbert jurisprudence. Moreover, it seemingly did so in response to
Smith’s invitation to be solicitous of religious liberty492 and in accordance
with Boerne’s allowance for congressional action based on its own
interpretation of the Constitution.493 Congress, however, retained final say
over courts’ decisionmaking, at least for federal purposes, as it always does
when courts interpret its laws.494 As enacted, RFRA appears to grant
protection to corporations. If the Supreme Court holds this to be true and
Congress disagrees, then Congress can amend the law accordingly.
Conversely, if the Court denies standing under RFRA, then Congress can
determine otherwise and adjust the law as needed. The important point is
that the Court should examine this claim as a statutory matter and not a
constitutional one.
b. Courts Should Develop a Jurisprudence To Determine the Contours of
Corporate RFRA Claims
Second, RFRA allows the Court to develop a statutory jurisprudence.
This is in contrast to the Sherbert regime, which was based in the
Constitution. As Justice Sotomayor explained in her in-chambers opinion,
the HHS mandate litigation presents a novel claim for religious liberty.495
The Court should not attempt to answer the RFRA question for all
corporate forms496 in one fell swoop. Corporate free speech provides an
analogue to this point. As the D.C. Circuit noted, Citizens United only
emerged after decades of excruciating analysis of the corporate speech
right.497 The Court did not allow corporations to claim the protections of
the Free Speech Clause overnight. Similarly, courts addressing the HHS
mandate cases should not define these cases as determining whether all—or
even most—corporations have RFRA rights.
The corporate plaintiffs in the cases percolating in the federal courts are
organized as closely held corporations.498 The owners of such corporations
also frequently tend to be the directors and managers, and they might make
business decisions that subvert their desire for profit to follow the
commands of their religion.499 For this reason, a closely held corporation
might state a claim under RFRA if its directors and owners instruct it to
follow religious conduct, and a law burdens that conduct. As Judge Sykes
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indicated, the individual owners do not compartmentalize their lives into
business and religion, so RFRA’s purposes could plausibly accommodate
an expansion of existing law to cover certain business.500 In fact, the Court
might find that allowing closely held corporations to state RFRA claims
will encourage individual flourishing, support religious pluralism, and
provide an important mediating layer between persons and government—all
of which are purposes of religious liberty.501
For the same reasons, a multinational, publicly held corporation will
likely struggle to have the same dedication to a religious belief and could
very easily fall outside of RFRA’s protection.502 Its owners and directors
likely will not present a unified religious face, and the profit-generating
capacity of the business will act by necessity to compartmentalize the
individual shareholders and directors’ religious and business lives. Simply
put, a more diverse ownership will likely not tolerate a religious
accommodation in its pursuit of profit. Moreover, such corporations are
unlikely to be seen as promoting human flourishing or religious pluralism in
the way that small, community-oriented businesses might be.503 Only after
a developed jurisprudence emerges, however, will the full contours of this
issue be visible. To cut such a nascent jurisprudence off now, however,
would be an injustice to religious liberty and those religious believers who
see their small businesses as an extension of their religious life.
Corporations should have the ability to state RFRA claims, and the Court
should allow the federal judiciary to engage in an adjudicative process that
seeks to determine the contours between religious liberty and corporate
form.
B. If the Court Precludes All Corporations From RFRA, Then the D.C.
Circuit Provides an Alternative Approach
If the Supreme Court rejects the above analysis, it should affirm the D.C.
Circuit’s shareholder-standing exception.504 Although the details of this
standing rule are beyond the scope of this Note, the Gilardi court provided
a persuasive reason for why a close corporation should be able to state the
claims of its shareholders.
Incorporation should not equal the
disappearance of a constitutional or statutory right without a corporate
analogue.505 If a sole proprietor or a nonprofit corporation may claim
protection, then it is a perverse incentive to religious believers to withhold
protection upon incorporation. This shareholder exception would allow
owners to state claims that their corporations are otherwise precluded from
litigating. Doing this would preserve the American tradition of protecting

500. See supra note 362 and accompanying text.
501. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
502. See Willis, supra note 11, at 71–72.
503. Cf. supra note 239 (listing scholars and an activist group that reject the notion of
rights for corporations).
504. See supra Part II.C.
505. See supra notes 421–22 and accompanying text.

2000

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

religious liberty while also maintaining a formal respect for the corporate
form.
CONCLUSION
Some other aspect of the RFRA analysis might conceivably doom
Hobby Lobby and other for-profit corporations in their quest for an
exemption from the HHS mandate. Courts might find that providing the
contraceptives to which they object may not be a substantial burden or that
the government has a compelling interest to override the plaintiffs’
objections. This will undoubtedly be the source of much future litigation.
The question of these corporations’ ability to exercise religion and their
standing under RFRA, however, should not be the fatal aspect. The support
given to religious liberty by Congress, the Supreme Court, the Founders,
and, ultimately, the American people is simply too great for such a result to
be satisfactory.

